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Undesirable but Unreturnable Migrants
Policy Brief
Policy challenges around excluded asylum seekers and other migrants suspected of
serious criminality who cannot be removed
A project funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council
The problem
States are increasingly confronted with migrants who are Undesirable but Unreturnable (UBUs).
Undesirability is caused by three types of exclusion which relate to serious criminality:
i) Exclusion of asylum seekers believed to have committed crimes before arriving in the host state under Article 1F 
Refugee Convention. While it is difficult to determine the size of this group, it appears relatively small. However it is 
likely to grow in the near future;
ii) Revoking status of persons who commit crimes after arriving in the host state. From the available data this group 
appears relatively large and is likely to grow in the near future; 
iii) Not granting or revoking a status because of current and future security concerns in the host state. This issue appears 
relatively small in scale but is expected to grow in the near future.
Unreturnability exists because of (i) legal or (ii) practical reasons, most importantly: 
i) The principle of non-refoulement; forced removal to the country of origin is not permitted under e.g. the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) or the Convention Against Torture (CAT) where there is a real risk of serious 
harm to the individual;
ii) Lack of travel documents, non-cooperation by excluded individual or state of origin frustrate return. 
It is difficult to determine the size of this problem in countries in the Global South. However, for countries in close proximity to 
conflict situations (e.g. Turkey) this is likely to represent a growing problem in the future.
Migrants who are undesirable because of alleged involvement in serious criminality but unreturnable because of legal or 
practical reasons may present decision makers, policy makers and the responsible politicians with significant challenges. 
While there are different short-term policy responses to the issue, a considerable group of these individuals will always 
remain in legal limbo, sometimes for many years. A coherent solution is currently lacking, as is guidance on how to deal 
with this group of persons. Building upon two network meetings with academics and practitioners, this document defines 
the problem, describes current state responses and explores possibilities of future policy solutions.
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A heterogeneous group
The group of UBUs is highly diverse. Arguably, from the point of view of public policy some UBUs are ‘more undesirable’ than others. 
Some are deemed ‘undeserving’ of refugee protection because of alleged war crimes that may have occurred years ago in far-away 
countries, and may not pose an acute security threat to the receiving country. At the other end of the spectrum, others may be 
convicted terrorists who continue to pose a concrete threat to the host state’s public order or public security. Arguably, in terms of 
political sensitivity, one may differentiate between the following groups on a continuum: 
• Alleged or convicted perpetrators of relatively non-serious crimes ‘conventional’ crimes committed in the host country (e.g. 
economic crimes)
• Alleged or convicted perpetrators of relatively serious ‘international crimes’ committed abroad (war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, genocide
• Alleged or convicted perpetrators of serious ‘conventional’ crimes committed in the host country and ‘security cases’ (e.g. 
rape, murder, terrorism)
Existing policy responses
Most states periodically assess if and to what extent return or other modes of removal are possible. They are allowed to temporarily 
detain UBUs when swift return or removal is considered to be a realistic prospect. When such a prospect is lacking, states apply a 
variety of different policy responses in dealing with UBUs. During the network meetings the following approaches were discussed: 
• Extradite or transfer UBUs to a state or international tribunal or court willing to prosecute. This only affects a small number 
of individuals. International tribunals and courts are only interested in prosecuting a limited number of individuals, typically 
those individuals considered to be the ‘most responsible’ or directly involved. States are often not interested in prosecuting 
UBUs as most of them are low level perpetrators with indirect involvement. If they are interested, extradition may be blocked 
because of human rights or fair trial concerns.
• Domestically prosecute UBUs on the basis of universal jurisdiction. This only affects a small number of individuals. For 
example, since 1994 only just over 50 1F-excluded individuals have been successfully domestically prosecuted worldwide. 
Such prosecutions are extremely resource-intensive and complex because of the nature of the alleged crimes and the context 
in which they allegedly took place. 
• Create diplomatic assurances to address human rights concerns in a third state and enable removal. As concluding such 
assurances takes a large amount of time and resources, this too only affects a small number of cases. 
• Provide temporary residence permits. With the above options not available in many cases, various states temporarily ‘tolerate’ 
the stay of UBUs, either through already existing schemes (e.g. Germany) or by providing tailored schemes (e.g. Norway, the 
UK, Denmark). Different modalities exist; some states grant a status which allows the UBU to e.g. work, rent a house and 
enjoy health insurance, others include serious restrictions and may include possibilities of home detention or electronic 
monitoring (e.g. France). See annex 1 for an overview of different policies that exist in relation to 1F-excluded individuals in 
developed countries.
• Do not provide any status. A limited number of states (e.g. The Netherlands, Belgium) do not provide any temporary residence 
permit or leave to remain. This means that the UBUs are considered undocumented migrants and are not allowed to work, 
rent a house or enjoy health insurance. 
Undesirable but 
Unreturnable migrants
 in Europe and North America
Exclusion under Article 
1F for crimes committed 
outside host state 
Estimated total group size: 
Hundreds
Revocation of permit or 
status for crimes committed 
in host state 
Estimated total group size: 
Thousands
Refusal or revocation of 
permit or status for adverse 
security assessments 
Estimated total group size: 
Hundreds
Undesirable but unreturnable 5
• Indefinite detention. European and North American countries can only temporarily detain UBUs in cases where swift return 
or removal is considered a realistic option. Indefinite detention is not allowed. In contrast, in Australia UBUs can be detained 
even where swift relocation to third countries is not possible. De facto, this might mean indefinite detention. 
Effects of existing policy responses
Current policy responses are often ad-hoc in nature and do not provide any structural or long term solutions on how to deal 
with protracted situations of undesirability and unreturnability. For the individuals concerned, existing policy responses may have 
severe social, economic, physical and psychological consequences. A situation that may persist for many years, if not decades. 
At the same time, governments are often criticized for ‘hosting criminals’. Public perception on the issue is, however, mixed. In 
some countries the (temporary) ‘toleration’ of UBUs seems to be accepted or is not given a great deal of attention in the media 
or in politics. In other countries the topic is highly politicized. Governments may on the one hand be criticized for having deemed 
members of particular groups undesirable too easily (e.g. the Netherlands in relation to high-ranking Afghan Khad/WAD members) 
or, on the other hand, of too readily granting human rights protection to alleged offenders (e.g. the UK). 
Directions of future policy solutions
The lack of a coherent policy response to the issue suggests there is a need for guidance. During the network meetings it was 
agreed that first steps to deal with the matter could be to implement measures that can limit the number of (allegedly) criminal 
migrants ending up in legal limbo. In this regard one could think of either (i) decreasing the number of persons deemed to be 
undesirables, or (ii) increasing the number of returns and/or removals.
• Decreasing the number of undesirables could e.g. be done by narrowing categories of crimes that may lead to refusal or 
revocation of citizenship to only truly serious crimes, by limiting the number of 1F exclusions and by investing more in 
criminal prosecution.
• Increasing the number of returns and removals could e.g. be done by investing in the rule of law in countries of origin, 
facilitating extradition (e.g. by investing in criminal justice system in country of origin), providing UBUs incentives to return 
voluntarily and by more actively inducing third countries to consider relocation, by improving administrative procedures 
related to return or by more actively engaging in setting up diplomatic assurances/Memoranda of Understanding with third 
states, including collective ones.
The above measures may limit the scale of the problem. But whatever measures are taken, countries will continue to be faced with 
a limited number of UBUs in a protracted situation of limbo, possibly indefinitely. For this reason there remains a need to formulate 
long-term solutions to address the issue. During the network meetings various options were discussed, of which the prospect of 
creating a ‘balancing test’ seemed most promising. For example, in case a UBU has demonstrably not been in the position to return 
for 10/15/20 years a judge could weigh the interests of the state to prolong the status of undesirability (level of acute security 
threat, seriousness of the alleged crimes, mode of complicity, level of responsibility) against the UBU’s interests of having the status 
of undesirability lifted (social, psychological, physical impact of protracted limbo situation). Even if this is done, there will remain a 
number of individuals who continue to be in limbo; government might channel their resources to try and extraterritorially prosecute 
or extradite that (much lower) number.
Without a coordinating body pushing for and overseeing the implementation of a harmonized and coherent approach, it is not 
likely that this will take shape in the near future. So far, UNHCR has considered the issue of unreturnable 1F-excluded asylum 
seekers to fall outside its mandate. It has not published any guidance in this regard. The EU recently steered a brainstorming with 
Member States experts on a harmonised approach in regularising irregular migrants – undesirable migrants included – who cannot 
be returned. Suggested criteria to take into account ranged from the level of cooperation of the migrants, the length of factual stay 
and integration efforts made by the migrant, to family links and the need to avoid rewarding irregularity. Member States experts 
seemed, however, to unanimously reject this proposal. Arguably they prefer retaining full discretionary powers in dealing with such 
matters, rather than being subjected to a harmonized approach.
The inactivity of the EU or UNCHR should however not bar countries to independently develop structural solutions to this issue. 
A number of countries – in particular in Scandinavia – are already working on developing long term policies. The findings of this 
project, and the various academic publications that will follow, can help countries in shaping such solutions.
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Annex 1




Duration Access to 
employment
Restrictions w/r place 
of residence
Monitoring Prospect of permanent 
status
Australia No - No Detention No No
Belgium No - No No No No
Denmark No - No Yes, housed in 
designated asylum 
centre
Yes, daily reporting 
duty to police, 
assessment of 
possibilities of 
return every 6 
months
No
France No - No Yes, home custody, 
designated place 
of residence or 
detention
Yes, reporting duty 
to police
No
Germany Yes Up to a few 
months at a 
time
Yes, possibility to 
apply for work permit 
after 3 months




of return on 
reapplication
Yes, possibility to apply for 
permanent residence after 
18 months
Netherlands No - No No Yes, assessment 
of possibilities of 
return, in principle 
every 6 months
No, unless on 
humanitarian ground or 
on the basis of ‘durability 
and proportionality test’
Norway Yes 7 months at a 
time
Yes, under conditions No Yes, assessment 
of possibilities 
of return on 
reapplication
Yes, possibility to apply 
for permanent residence 
after 10 years, but strict 
conditions
Sweden Yes 12 months at 
a time
Yes No Yes, assessment 
of possibilities 
of return on 
reapplication
Yes, after several renewals, 
depending on seriousness 
of crime
UK Yes 6 months at a 
time
Yes, under conditions, 
based on risk 
assessment




of return on 
reapplication
No
* Canada and the United States have not been included in this table. The overlapping admissibility and exclusion schemes in Canada mean the situation is too 
complex to be adequately reflected in this table. For a detailed analysis of the measures imposed in Canada, please see Bond’s country report on Canada. The 
approach to excluded individuals in the United States also makes it unsuitable for inclusion. Although in the United States there exist various bars to asylum on 
account of suspected involvement with criminal and terrorist activity, Article 1F of the Refugee Convention is not applied in its traditional sense and as a result the 
situation in the United States is not suitable for comparison with other developed countries. 
‘Undesirable but unreturnable?’ Policy challenges around 
excluded asylum seekers and other migrants suspected 
of serious criminality but who cannot be removed
International conference, 25–26 January 2016 
Conference Report
Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, University of London
The conference was introduced by Dr David Cantor and Dr Joris van Wijk, who set out the scope and purpose of the two-day event. 
The conference came about through a network comprised of academics and policy makers looking into post-exclusion issues, 
namely, what to do when asylum seekers are excluded from refugee status on account of suspected criminality but cannot be 
returned to their country of origin or former habitual residence. Consideration of this issue led to another question, namely: how 
do States respond to other migrants accused of serious criminality who similarly cannot be removed? 
Since the inception of the network, the focus has therefore broadened to include three types of Undesirables but Unreturnable 
migrants (UBUs):
i) non-nationals the host State has serious reasons to consider have committed serious crimes before entering the 
territory of the host State;
ii) non-nationals who have committed a serious crime after arriving in the host country; and 
iii) non-nationals who are deemed to be a threat to the national security of the host country. 
The reasons these groups are often unreturnable are varied, ranging from human rights concerns in their home country to practical 
obstacles to removal, for example lack of identity documents or cooperation from the country of origin. 
Turning to available responses, States have responded to UBUs through a variety of measures, including prosecution, detention, 
extradition, removal to a safe third country, grants of temporary leave or simple inaction. State responses to UBUs are typically 
short-term in nature, which leaves many UBUs in legal and practical limbo, often for considerable lengths of time. 
The format of the two-day conference was split between thematic issues and country reports. Day one began by looking at thematic 
issues surrounding UBUs and the responses available to States. This included criminal law responses to UBUs – prosecution, 
extradition and the conclusion of criminal justice – and other measures such as the use of diplomatic assurances, voluntary return 
and relocation. The presentations then moved on to discuss country-specific reports focusing on European civil law jurisdictions. 
Day two began by looking at country reports on common law jurisdictions before turning to consider State responses in selected 
countries in the Global South. This was followed by presentations on the perspectives of international institutions (namely UNHCR 
and the European Union), and the conference concluded with a roundtable discussion on how it might be possible for States to 
move towards harmonised solutions in this area. The diverse range of presentations, discussions and final roundtable provide a 
unique opportunity also to develop practical and meaningful policy proposals.
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Day One
Session 1: Prosecuting undesirable and unreturnable migrants 
Prosecution of undesirable and unreturnable persons
Dr Joseph Rikhof, University of Ottawa, Dept.of Justice, Canada 
Dr Rikhof opened the first session by discussing the complex 
issue of prosecution in relation to UBUs. His talked focused on 
asylum seekers who have been excluded from refugee status 
due to suspected involvement in serious crimes as set out 
by Article 1F of the 1951 Refugee Convention (1F-excluded 
persons) but who are unable to be removed due to legal or 
practical obstacles.
Dr Rikhof considered the terms undesirable and unreturnable 
as potentially wide in scope. For example a person could be 
considered undesirable based on alleged criminality ranging 
from international crimes to small petty crimes. Furthermore, 
the concept of unreturnability could stem from vastly different 
obstacles to removal, including lack of commitment to human 
rights treaties in the home state, medical issues to more 
practical issues such as lack of travel documents. Dr Rikhof 
set out four groups of undesirables: (i) non-refugees that have 
committed crimes before arriving in the host State; (ii) non-
refugees and migrants that commit crimes in the host state; (iii) 
refugees that are involved in undesirable activities after they 
have arrived in the host state; and (iv) refugees who committed 
crimes before they arrived in the host state. 
For this last group of persons (1F-excluded persons), the scale 
of the problem is small in terms of numbers. Additionally, 
prosecutions have been rare and are likely to remain so even 
if the number of exclusions increases. Between 1994 and 
2016, 14 countries (within Europe and North America) have 
initiated 51 criminal proceedings for crimes committed outside 
of their territory (applying extra-territorial jurisdiction), which 
resulted in 48 convictions in total. Most crimes that have been 
prosecuted in these countries have been serious international 
crimes that fall under 1F(a) such as crimes against humanity, 
war crimes, genocide and torture (although some European 
countries such as Belgium, Denmark and Germany have 
exercised universal jurisdiction for common crimes under 1F(b) 
or (c), though this has only be used sparingly). 
A running theme throughout the conference is the lack of 
data on these issues. However, the Netherlands is one country 
where data is available regarding excluded asylum seekers 
and prosecutions. Between 1992 and 2014, while 920 asylum 
seekers were excluded by reference to 1F, nine criminal 
proceedings were started against only 14 people, of which only 
12 were successfully prosecuted, making that an exclusion/
conviction rate of 1.4 per cent. For other countries such as 
France, Belgium and Canada, the prosecution rate is even lower. 
Dr Rikhof’s findings suggest prosecution of these IF-excluded 
persons is incredibly difficult for a number of reasons. First, 
they often involve international or transnational crimes, such 
as genocide or terrorism, which are often complex crimes. 
Second, practical issues such as permission to investigate on 
the territory of the third country is not always straightforward. 
Third, even when an investigation starts, dealing with different 
legal systems and locating and interviewing witnesses is 
incredibly time-consuming and expensive. For example one 
investigation and prosecution in Canada reportedly cost 4 
million Canadian dollars. 
While not viewing prosecution as a complete or even partial 
solution to the problem of UBUs, Dr Rikhof noted that a criminal 
justice approach is nevertheless an important tool in combating 
impunity from justice and in light of its deterrent effects. 
Undesirable yet unreturnable – extradition and other forms 
of rendition
Professor Geoff Gilbert, University of Essex, UK  
Professor Gilbert discussed how extradition and rendition can 
be used to avoid impunity. This area raises a number of complex 
questions relating to domestic law, the interaction between 
international refugee law, international human rights law, and 
international criminal law. He began by setting out general 
principles which must be borne in mind when looking at this 
area, before moving on to more substantive issues. 
There are a number of key principles that must be noted in 
relation to extradition and rendition. First, while many people 
are unreturnable, the undesirable in this group are a very small 
sub-set. Additionally, although some UBUs are not protected 
by non-refoulement obligations under the 1951 Refugee 
Convention, they are nonetheless non-returnable under human 
rights treaties. 
Second, protection can be removed for those who are not 
deemed to be unreturnable by reference to various laws and 
concepts: 
a) Article 1F(a) and (b) of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention refer to the commission of crimes 
that can lead to exclusion from refugee status, 
while Article 1F(c) refers to acts (not crimes). As 
a result, many countries exclude asylum seekers 
on the basis of 1F(c) even where the individual 
is not suspected of committing a crime per se. 
This may also be the case where the first limb of 
Article 33(2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention, is 
applied. This provision provides that persons who 
are a danger to the security of the host country 
may not avail themselves of protection against 
refoulement under the 1951 Refugee Convention. 
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b) The second limb of 33(2) states that the Article 
33(1) non-refoulement obligation does not apply 
to persons convicted of a serious crime and who 
constitute a danger to the community. Professor 
Gilbert suggested this could only be applied to 
expulsions if the prosecution occurred in the home 
country (where the serious crime took place) or in 
the host county under universal jurisdiction. 
c) Paragraph 7 of the 1950 UNHCR Statute has 
different wording in relation to persons excluded 
from UNHCR mandate. However, 1F postdates 
paragraph 7 and so 1F should be used by UNHCR 
when conducting RSD. This approach is also 
consistent with the fact that States’ obligations 
relate to the 1951 Refugee Convention (i.e. 1F) 
rather than the UNHCR Statute. 
d) Professor Gilbert suggested that perhaps it was 
time for a different test under 1F which takes 
account of the two different aspects involved. 
Such a test could take into account the degree of 
participation of an individual in the commission 
of a crime or act rather than a simple blanket 
exclusion on the basis of any form of participation.
Another key principle to note is ‘extraditable’ does not mean 
‘excludable’ and vice versa. They involve two different tests 
and so should not be confused. Professor Gilbert noted that in 
relation to excludability many difficult questions are raised, for 
example what constitutes a ‘serious’ non-political crime under 
1F(b). 
Professor Gilbert also discussed exclusion and international 
human rights law. As already noted, even if someone is 
excluded from international refugee protection, human rights 
may continue to act as a bar to removal. For example in the 
Rwanda 5 case, which concerned the attempted extradition of 
a number of suspected Rwandan genocidaires from the UK to 
Rwanda to face trial, although the UK courts decided that the 
situation in Rwanda was sufficiently serious to trigger Article 
3 of the ECHR (prohibition on torture), it did trigger Article 6 
(right to a fair trial) and so the extradition request was denied.
Moving onto substantive issues, Professor Gilbert turned 
to extradition requests and exclusion from refugee status. 
First, while ‘serious reasons’ are necessary to exclude under 
1F, the standard under extradition law can be much lower. 
Furthermore, Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention is 
no bar to extradition orders if the requesting country is safe 
(and the requesting country is not of course the country of 
origin). However, many extradition laws do not allow for the 
extradition of nationals and as some countries treat recognised 
refugees as nationals, this can prevent extradition. A further 
issue is double criminality, which can be complex but is required 
in some states: namely the alleged crime committed needs to 
be seen as a crime in both states for an extradition request to 
be valid. 
The issue of aut dedere, aut judicare (the obligation of states to 
prosecute persons who have committed serious international 
crimes when there has been no extradition request from 
another state) is also often difficult to implement in practice. 
There are not many incidents of universal jurisdiction operating 
in practice but some countries are more willing than others 
to initiate proceedings on this basis. For example, Germany is 
happy to prosecute war crimes. The country has to be prepared 
to invest in the prosecution though it is an expensive process, 
but once you invest the first time, subsequent prosecutions 
become more cost effective. 
To conclude, Professor Gilbert, reiterated that extradition is not 
the same as exclusion. Exclusion does not automatically mean 
an individual is extraditable. Extradition is one way to deal with 
undesirables but does not offer a comprehensive solution. 
Finally, there appears to be much more willingness on the part 
of states to cooperate in relation to international prosecutions 
for low level crimes rather than for high level ones that the 
home state itself wishes to prosecute.
When international criminal justice concludes: undesirable 
but unreturnable individuals at the ICC  
Emma Irving, University of Amsterdam, Netherlands  
Emma Irving discussed the consequences for UBUs when 
international criminal justice has run its course, whether at 
the termination of a prison sentence or after an acquittal, 
specifically focusing on persons charged by the International 
Criminal Court (ICC). 
For understandable reasons, States are often reluctant to allow 
persons charged with international crimes on their territory, 
particularly if public opinion is against them. In these scenarios 
Ms Irving questioned what role (if any) the ICC can play in the 
relocating these UBUs. 
Individuals tried by the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) have generally found acceptance 
in their home countries, while the experience in relation 
to individuals tried by the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (ICTR) has been very different. The change in 
government following the genocide has meant the reception of 
war criminals or those acquitted by the ICTR has been hostile 
and violent. For these reasons, some have been moved to safe 
houses in Tanzania, with restrictions placed on their liberty 
for periods of over 10 years. While the ICTY’s activities have 
concluded and the ICTR is coming to end, this issue is far from 
over with respect to the ICC. 
With this in mind, Emma Irving sees three possible approaches 
the ICC has at its disposal to assist the relocation of UBUs when 
their interaction with the criminal process comes to an end. First, 
through coordination and communication, the ICC can assist 
in finding a State that may be willing to host the individual(s) 
concerned: with contacts throughout the world, this would be 
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far easier coordinated by the ICC than left to the individual. 
There is the possibility that the ICC is already facilitating these 
kinds of agreements through ‘quiet diplomacy’. Second, the ICC 
could adapt existing ICC protection infrastructures to aid UBUs. 
For example, there are a number of protection mechanisms 
that are set in motion to protect witnesses, such as the ‘initial 
response system’ – a hotline for people in imminent danger. 
Third, the ICC have sought assurances in the past from home 
State in relating to the protection of witnesses. This could be 
transposed to assist UBUs, especially if the threat comes from 
the home State itself. 
Finally, as to whether we can apply lessons learned 
from exploring the ICC situation to broader contexts of 
unreturnability remains unclear. First, these situations are in 
many instances specific to the ICC, for example where people 
become unreturnable because of ICC involvement. Second, the 
ICC has institutional responsibilities and attributes that make it 
a unique actor.
First panel discussion
It was pointed out that the cooperation of the host state is vital 
in the prosecution of UBUs in the universal jurisdiction setting. 
For example, the UK has had problems trying to prosecute 
many Rwandans who were involved in the genocide because 
the Rwandan government has refused to cooperate. However 
recent trends show that prosecution is more successful in 
situations where international tribunals have already been 
set up (i.e. the ICTY and the ICTR) due to the large databases, 
transcripts of witnesses and willingness of the State concerned 
to cooperative. Where home States remain uncooperative it is 
still possible to prosecute, for example using witnesses based 
outside the home country, though this has proven a harder 
route to follow in practice. 
Turning to the issue of discretion, it was noted that most 
countries abide by standards of discretion in their criminal 
investigation procedures and a number of factors are weighed 
up when deciding whether to pursue prosecution. For example, 
the amount of evidence available, whether prosecution is in 
the public interest and the costs involved. For certain countries 
such as Canada, there are certain circumstances where they 
have a duty to prosecute (see Professor Gilbert’s talk above). 
Even in these situations, however, other considerations are 
taken into account, for example the role the person played 
in the crime i.e. most states like Canada are focused on 
prosecuting the most high-level/senior offenders or persons 
directly involved in the commission of a crime. The fact that the 
vast majority of the 1F population have been excluded for low 
level or indirect involvement may therefore be another reason 
not to contemplate prosecution. Ultimately, the decision as to 
whether or not to pursue prosecution for crimes committed 
abroad is discretionary, and to a large extend dependent on 
financial, time and resource constraints. 
It was suggested that some States may, in certain situations, 
see it as political advantageous to accommodate a UBU. 
However this seems unlikely and in relation to numbers we are 
taking about tens of people rather than hundreds or thousands. 
Nevertheless, empirical evidence suggests that around one per 
cent of asylum claimants could end up in the exclusion stream; 
if this is correct it could have a profound effect on countries 
hosting large numbers of asylum seekers, e.g. within the 
context of the current refugee crisis in Europe.
As was seen with Emma Irving’s presentation, prosecution 
does not solve the issue of housing UBUs permanently. Once a 
person has been convicted, served his or her time and released 
there is still the question of where they should, or indeed can, 
reside. 
The first ever person to be released after serving a sentence 
having been convicted by the ICC was discussed. Interestingly 
and rather unusually, just before his release Germain Katanga 
was transferred by the ICC in December 2015 to the DRC (his 
home country) to serve the rest of his sentence there. This 
had never been done before, and it looks like he will face new 
domestic criminal charges when his ICC sentence is completed. 
Finally, the discussion turned to extradition. First, it was noted 
that there are many ways extraditions treaties are monitored. 
Two of the clearest ways are through the individuals involved (by 
challenging the process) and the extraditing State. History has 
predominantly shown that States respect extradition treaties 
(for example, they only prosecute the crime on which the 
extradition request was based, even if there might be separate 
further grounds on which an individual may be charged). 
Second, there are situations when a third country (i.e. not the 
host country or the country of origin) may wish to extradite a 
UBU. This can occur when a crime has been committed in a 
transit country or when travelling. 
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Session 2: Other measures for addressing UBUs 
Deporting undesirable migrants: diplomatic assurances and 
the challenge of human rights 
Dr Mariagiulia Giuffré, Edge Hill University, UK  
Dr Giuffre used human rights case law to outline instances 
in which States have attempted to deport UBUs to countries 
that fall foul of the principle of non-refoulement1 through the 
use of diplomatic assurances (DAs). The scope of the talk was 
restricted to (i) refugees whose refugee status has been denied 
under 1F (1F-excluded persons); and (ii) people who, falling foul 
of Article 33(2) of the 1951 Convention, are not granted the 
benefit of non-refoulement under Article 33(1) despite being 
recognised as refugees. 
DAs are undertakings by receiving States that a deportee 
will be treated in a particular manner, as a way of facilitating 
the transference of people who have been left in legal limbo 
because the host state finds them undesirable but are deemed 
unreturnable due to human rights concerns in the receiving 
State. While DA’s are not explicitly mentioned in international 
human rights treaties, they have become a popular tool used 
to remove individuals who are perceived as a threat to the 
national security of the host State. 
While in principle DAs can be used to ensure compliance with 
States’ non-refoulement obligations, recent cases have shown 
that in practice DAs have not removed the real risk of torture 
and ill treatment in the receiving country. For example, the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has found a violation 
of Article 3 (prohibition on torture) of the ECHR had occurred 
in several cases where DAs were agreed between the receiving 
and sending State. 
DAs can take various forms, ranging from as exchange of 
letters to more complex agreements such the UK’s approach 
of requesting receiving states sign a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU). These MoUs set out in writing a list of 
assurances concerning the humane treatment to be given to 
the returnee by the receiving State. In the case of Abu Qatada v 
UK, the UK government tried to send a suspected terrorist back 
to Jordan through the signing of a MoU. The ECtHR however 
found that, despite the existence of the MoU, Abu Qatada 
would still be at risk of a violation of Article 6 (right to a fair trial) 
if returned to Jordan to stand trial there. This was particularly in 
relation to the risk that evidence obtained by torture would be 
used in such a trial. The ECtHR concluded that torture in Jordan 
remains widespread and routine and is practiced with impunity. 
Nevertheless, relying on strong political relations between 
the two countries, the ECtHR viewed the MoU specific and 
comprehensive enough to remove any real risk of ill treatment 
contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR. Eventually the two countries 
1 As set out in the 1951 Refugee Convention and international human 
rights treaties: Article 3 of the Convention against Torture (CAT), Article 7 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and Article 3 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
signed a new ‘mutual legal assistance agreement’ which was 
entered into in June 2013 which contained a number of fair trial 
guarantees for deportees. 
Attempts by the UK Government to use MoUs to assist with 
the removal of Abu Qatada should be seen in the context of a 
State trying to remove all foreign born terror suspects from its 
territory due to a highly charged political climate surrounding 
this issue. Even though Abu Qatada was ultimately acquitted 
of the charges he faced in Jordan evidence obtained by torture 
was relied upon in his trial (although not considered sufficient 
grounds for a conviction by the Jordanian court).
Are DAs therefore a valuable tool in addressing the problem 
of UBUs? They may help establish human rights standards in 
relation to specific persons on an ad hoc basis, but it is difficult 
to generalise and DAs should be considered on a case-by-
case basis. However, it is hard to envisage them ever being 
completely effective in preventing torture and ill- treatment, 
because by its very nature, torture is often administered in 
secret. Furthermore, the very fact a State has entered into a 
DA with a receiving State indicates the receiving State has a 
poor human rights record. As such, with assurances should 
be treated with caution. On a normative level, how can you 
guarantee humane treatment for one person when torture is 
widely practiced in the State? 
Removal, voluntary return and relocation: a case study of 1f 
excluded individuals in the Netherlands   
Dr Joris van Wijk, VU University Amsterdam, Netherlands  
Dr van Wijk looked at the experiences and challenges involved 
in removing 1F-excluded individuals, with particular focus on 
the practice of the Netherlands. Dr van Wijk discussed: i) the 
forced removal of long-term UBUs; ii) promoting voluntary 
return to the country of origin; and iii) promoting relocation to 
third countries. 
The Netherlands, together with Canada, is very active in 
applying 1F exclusions. The Netherlands considers exclusion 
issues before inclusion during refugee status determination, 
which means persons are assessed under 1F of the 1951 
Refugee Convention before they have even been assessed for 
refugee status (see James Simeon’s critique of this approach 
below). If a person is considered to fall within the scope of 
either 1F (a), (b) or (c), their asylum application is immediately 
rejected. As a result, rates of exclusion in the Netherlands are 
higher than most other countries. 
In the Netherlands, removal is the norm for 1F-excluded 
persons unless the person is unreturnable. If there is a bar 
on removal, such as ill-treatment concerns in the country of 
origin, this is assessed every six months to ascertain whether 
the situation in the home state has altered. In cases where the 
individual cannot return to his country of residence because 
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Article 3 ECHR applies, the obligation to leave the Netherlands 
still rests on the 1F-excluded person.
Unreturnability is seen as temporary in nature by the State but 
UBUs are not given temporary status. In practice the situation 
for UBUs in the Netherlands is far from temporary, and many 
are left in a legal and status ‘limbo’ for indefinite periods of 
time. 
Interestingly, public opinion in the Netherlands is very much 
on the side of the 1F-excluded individual over the State. The 
public tend to see these individuals as victims of the system 
and favours them remaining in the Netherlands rather than be 
subject to removal proceedings. For example, a wave of national 
sympathy attached to the case of an Afghan man who was 
threatened with deportation having lived in the Netherlands 
for 15 years with his family; even the local mayor pushed for 
him to be allowed to remain. 
The Netherlands actively encourages 1F-excluded persons 
who cannot return because of the application of Article 3 
ECHR to voluntarily relocate to a third country. Every 6 months 
the reparation and return service contacts the 1F-excluded 
person to talk about the progress of leaving the Netherlands 
to a third country if they cannot return to their country of 
origin. Voluntary return of 1F-excluded persons is, however, 
not actively facilitated by the government. Even if 1F-excluded 
persons want to return voluntarily, they are e.g. excluded from 
making use of reintegration packages . 
In regards to relocation and resettlement, Dr van Wijk noted that 
institutional arrangements are non-existent in the Netherlands 
and so must be self-arranged by the UBU. This leads to two 
different types of scenarios, one formal and one informal. First, 
individuals can adopt a legal approach such as applying for a 
visa. Second, the individual can attempt to cross into a third 
country without a status and live there illegally. An interesting 
development in the European context is the so-called ‘Europe 
Route’. This is where spouses of UBUs move to another country 
in Europe and obtain a residence permit, under EU law they 
can after a certain period of time then apply for reunification 
and bring their UBU spouse to join them. Due to minimal 
information exchange between States, this has proven quite 
a successful way by which UBUs can regularise their stay in 
Europe. 
Finally, Dr van Wijk noted that the numbers of persons in this 
form of limbo are currently low. However, the nature of the 
problem means it is a compelling topic – the persons affected 
are on a vast sliding scale ranging from persons who committed 
crimes 20 years ago to people currently active in criminal 
and terrorist activities. Additionally, the European Route is an 
interesting individual solution to obtaining legal status, though 
hardly a solution States would agree on.
Second panel discussion
It was noted that like the Netherlands, in the UK there are 
pro-migration sections of the population who fight against the 
expulsion of UBUs. However it was suggested that often the 
public are not aware of all the facts surrounding these cases. 
Additionally, deportations with assurances in the UK setting are 
expensive and only carried out in exceptional scenarios. 
The discussion then focused on existing mechanisms for 
monitoring diplomatic assurances. While they are essentially 
political agreements and so have to be analysed on a case-
by-case basis, a number of potential external monitoring 
mechanisms exist. First, domestic and international human 
rights bodies and NGOs have a role in monitoring the situation 
in the receiving state (for example by visiting jails and detention 
facilities). Also the individuals involved can lodge a complaint 
to a human rights body assuming the country has ratified the 
relevant treaties (although in reality the receiving state often is 
not party to international treaties such as CAT). Finally there is 
the question of state responsibility, where a state may report 
another for non-compliance in relation to an agreement, which 
could lead to reparation and restitution (depending on the 
terms of the agreement and jurisdiction). 
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Session 3: Practice in the European Union, civil law jurisdictions I
New exceptions to the principle of non-refoulement: the 
German case
Dr Burcu Toğral Koca, Eskişehir Osmangazi University, Turkey  
Session three moved from thematic issues to individual country 
reports, starting with Dr Koca who looked at the situation in 
Germany through a security lens. The securitisation of migration 
was in place in the EU context before the terrorist attacks of 11 
September 2001 on the United States. For example, since the 
introduction of the Schengen Zone in the mid-1980s, Europe 
has adopted a selective securitization approach focused on 
asylum seekers, economic migrants and unwanted migrants. 
However, following the 9/11 attacks terrorism became the 
main discourse in relation to all forms of migration in Germany. 
Two security packages and a new immigration law were 
swiftly passed with little discussion or debate in the German 
parliament. The asylum procedure was also changed and has 
become more restrictive, with a focus on preventing terrorism 
and discouraging potential terrorists from seeking asylum. 
In relation to the deportation of migrants, there is now a 
trend of applying administrative measures over criminal law, 
which results in less protection for the deportee while making 
it easier for the State to remove the individual. In addition, 
the use of discretionary expulsions which have been used by 
Germany to invoke the immediate removal of persons such 
as ‘hate preachers’ is another worrying trend. A deportation 
order authorized by the German Supreme Court has no notice 
attached to it, has immediate effect and the affected person is 
banned from re-entering the country. 
Migrants who are non-returnable are usually given a ‘toleration 
status’ – a so-called duldung. This status gives them leave to 
stay but often has many restrictions attached relating to areas 
such as freedom of movement (restricted to live in specific 
regions) and the right to work. This form of temporary status is 
also continually reviewed by the State. 
With terrorism seen more and more as a social construct being 
manipulated by States, Dr Koca suggests that special protection 
is needed for certain UBUs. Furthermore, the application of 
a proportionality test, with the opportunity of a regular legal 
status for UBUs who find themselves in these prolonged states 
of legal limbo, would go a long way to reducing the scale of the 
issue. 
Undesirable and unreturnable migrants under French law: 
between legal uncertainty and legal vacuum 
Chloé Peyronnet, Université Jean Moulin Lyon 3, France  
Chloé Peyronnet introduced the issue of UBUs in the context 
of France by noting that, while undesirable persons can be 
expelled from the country if they are deemed to be a threat 
to public policy, the term undesirable is undefined in French 
domestic law. As such, she argued that responses to UBUs in 
France are not consistent with the rule of law due to the wide 
discretion given to the State. Furthermore, the scale of the 
issue in France is difficult to gauge as official data only report 
the total number of removals and leaves out the reason for the 
removal (i.e. legal status, security threat, etc).
The general principle in France is that non-nationals can be 
deported if they represent a threat to public policy. There are 
however three exceptions to this principle. First, minors enjoy 
‘absolute protection’ (at least theoretically) against expulsion 
(Article L-521-4 of the Aliens Code). Second, when undesirables 
cannot be deported because they face a risk of persecution, they 
receive ‘quasi-absolute’ protection against expulsion (Article L. 
513-2 of the Aliens Code). Finally, a specific category of persons 
receive ‘relative protection’ against expulsion (Articles L. 521-1 
to L. 521-5 of the Aliens Code), for example if they meet a set of 
criteria that proves deportation would cause a disproportionate 
interference with their right to private or family life (Article 
8 ECHR). In addition to those who receive quasi-absolute or 
relative protection against deportation, practical obstacles can 
also mean the authorities cannot enforce an expulsion measure 
against a number of individuals.
France responds to these differing forms of UBUs in two ways: 
detention or home custody. Detention is used as a first choice, 
suggesting the graver punishment is the preferred choice. 
However, home custody itself is not a lenient measure – there is 
no definite end to this form of detention and it falls outside the 
scope of Article 5 of ECHR (prohibition on arbitrary detention) 
and the time limits implied by this human rights guarantee (see 
inter alia ECtHR Enhorn ruling). Furthermore, as communities 
are often unhappy with UBUs staying in their area, individuals 
subject to home custody are often moved around the country. 
The home custody response to UBUs in France intertwines 
administrative law with criminal law. Undesirables who cannot 
be removed for protection reasons (i.e. they enjoy a quasi- or 
absolute protection against deportation) can avoid detention 
if they fulfill two criteria: (i) prove they would face a risk of 
persecution if returned to their state of origin; and (ii) show 
they are unable to move to another State (Articles L. 523-3 
and L. 561-1 of the Aliens Code). While home custody is an 
administrative measure, a violation of the requirements of 
home custody is a criminal offence and can result in fines or 
imprisonment. Moreover, as in every other European country, 
being an irregular migrant is a criminal offence in France. As a 
result, irregular migrants that cannot be deported through the 
administrative processes can easily be imprisoned, and then be 
considered a threat to public policy on the primary ground that 
they have been in jail and finally become UBUs.
In the case of undesirables who are unable to be removed 
due to practical issues, the general principle is they should be 
detained. These UBUs can be granted home custody if they give 
assurances they will not breach the restrictions imposed by the 
measure. Again if the home custody conditions are breached, a 
prison sentence is the punishment. These forms of ‘remedies’ 
may last indefinitely – or until the person becomes ‘removable’.
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Chloé Peyronnet concluded her talk by making the salient point 
that the situation in France currently has to be understood 
within the context of the two terrorist attacks that occurred 
during 2015, to which the government reacted with extremely 
heavy-handed security measures. As a result of the attacks the 
system is changing rapidly. Migrants are presented as irregular 
migrants, and irregular migrants are presented as a threat to 
public policy. An example of the current political climate is the 
draft amendment to the French Constitution called ‘Protection 
of the Nation’ that provided the possibility of deprivation of 
French nationality for binational French-born citizens convicted 
of terrorist offences or other serious crimes – the aim being 
to circumvent the impossibility to deport French citizens. This 
has caused outrage among many politicians and academics 
since it was proposed. As Ms Peyronnet noted, it was unclear 
how in practice this would have worked when France, like so 
many countries, faces a great number of obstacles even trying 
to expel foreign nationals (i.e. UBUs). In the meantime, the 
president of the Republic announced the removal of the draft 
amendment, stating: “I decided to close the constitutional 
debate”. It remains to be seen how the situation will evolve in 
France. 
Non-removable migrants suspected or convicted of serious 
crimes in the Netherlands 
Maarten Bolhuis, VU University Amsterdam, Netherlands  
Maarten Bolhuis started his presentation by noting that asylum 
seekers are deemed undesirable in the Netherlands if they fall 
into one of three categories, namely, those the Netherlands 
has serious reasons to believe have committed a serious crime 
before entering the Netherlands; those that have committed 
a crime after arriving in the Netherlands; and those who are 
deemed to be a threat to national security. These persons 
become unreturnable usually by virtue of Article 3 of the ECHR, 
but other reasons such as medical grounds, interim measures 
of the ECtHR, and practical reasons (statelessness, lack of 
documents, etc) can all create a bar to removal. 
UBUs are served with an order to leave the Netherlands within 
28 days and are given an entry ban (for up to 20 years) or 
declaration of being a persona non grata. Non-compliance with 
these measures is a criminal offence. Where a person is non-
returnable they are therefore left in legal limbo with no access 
to a residence permit or leave to remain in the Netherlands, 
with no social allowance and only access to a minimal level of 
services such as legal aid and primary emergency health care.
While there are no official figures for persons given a removal 
order in consequence of committing crimes after they have been 
granted refugee status, there is data on 1F exclusions. Between 
1992 and 2014 there were 920 persons denied refugee status 
for reasons based on 1F(a), (b) or (c). This includes Afghanistan, 
Iraqi, Turkish and Angolan nationals, most of whom were 
excluded under 1F(a) for the suspected commission of war 
crimes or crimes against humanity. For certain nationalities 
there is a policy of categorical exclusion, meaning that merely 
holding a certain position within a designated organization 
suffices as a basis for exclusion. For example, a large number 
of Afghan asylum seekers have been excluded because they 
severed in the Khad/WAD security service. 
Turning to the question of unreturnability, between 2008 and 
2014 about 30 per cent of all 1F-excluded persons (180 of 
630 cases) were deemed unreturnable due to Article 3 ECHR 
concerns. The number of unreturnables are therefore not 
insignificant, which has left the Netherlands (along with many 
other countries) in a dilemma as to what to do with these 
people. 
Policies to deal with UBUs in the Netherlands have varied. 
Principally, the State encourages UBUs to leave. Furthermore 
as already stated, 1F-excluded individuals have no legal right 
to remain on Dutch territory and so there is no legal route 
to obtaining a form of residence permit. There are however 
two ad hoc policy measures that have the potential to lift 
the applicability of Article 1F. First there is a ‘durability and 
proportionality’ test: if a person has been a UBU for a number 
of years, they can apply for revocation of the application of 
Article 1F. The durability limb of this test requires the person 
to have been without residence for 10 years, with no prospect 
of change in relation to the Article 3 ECHR bar to removal and 
that departure to a third country is not possible. The second 
limb of the test (proportionality) is judged on whether the 
alien has made plausible that there are highly exceptional 
circumstances which mean that permanently refraining 
from granting him a residence permit is disproportionate. 
‘Exceptional circumstances’ include issues such as a medical or 
humanitarian emergency affecting the individual’s family life. 
Under the second ad hoc measure, the Minister of Security and 
Justice can grant a temporary residence permit to an individual 
who has been refused residence, through a discretionary power 
under Article 3(4)(3) of the Aliens Decree. While this power is 
broader than the durability and proportionality test outlined 
previously, it is only applied in unique situations, which amount 
to ‘harrowing’ situations. 
In practice these measures have not been used with any degree 
of frequency. The durability and proportionality test has led to 
residence permits in a very limited number of cases (10 cases as 
of April 2014) as both the durability and proportionality limbs 
have proven very high thresholds to meet. In relation to the 
Minister of Security and Justice’s power to grant temporary 
residence permits, figures are not known. 
Finally, there have been few attempts to prosecute UBUs, while 
extraditions or transfers to third countries have been attempted 
with mixed results. For example, the Netherlands has invested 
heavily in the judicial system in Rwanda to ease extradition 
procedures. Nonetheless the Dutch courts are still reluctant to 
extradite individuals to Rwanda. 
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To conclude, Maarten Bolhuis noted that due to the large 
number of 1F-excluded persons who cannot be refouled and 
with the few remedies that are available seldom used, many 
UBUs in the Netherlands are left in limbo: a situation which 
may last for 20 years or more.
Third panel discussion
The discussions began by looking into the current approach 
taken by France. While France has applied the EU Returns 
Directive to some degree, under national French law detention 
is still the preference when dealing with undesirable migrants if 
expulsion is not an option. Electronic surveillance has also been 
used, but sparingly. The courts in France have defined who can 
be given an expulsion measure or a ban from the territory so 
widely that it creates serious issues regarding the principles of 
legal certainty and of the rule of law. 
Discussions then turned to the UK situation. It was noted that 
exclusion under 1F is not only applied to suspected terrorists but 
also small to medium scale criminals. The UK has created tough 
measures for these people even though they are unreturnable. 
The question of whether these people should be rehabilitated 
rather than simply detaining them awaiting removal was also 
raised, though it is unlikely the UK will seriously pursue this 
option in relation to 1F-excluded persons. 
The ‘legal limbo’ faced by UBUs in the Netherlands and France 
is also present in the UK, although in comparison to the 
Netherlands the numbers of these persons are much lower. 
Perhaps it is time to consider cut-off points, for example, for 
people who committed crimes 40 years ago yet still live in limbo. 
In AH v Secretary of State, the passage of time since the alleged 
commission of a crime was potentially seen as a relevant factor 
in deciding the seriousness of the crime under 1F(b). That case 
has now been appealed to the Supreme Court. 
It was also pointed out that persons who are unidentifiable 
are perhaps not covered by the current definitions of UBUs. 
Particularly in the case of persons suffering mental health 
issues, there are times when it is impossible to identify them. 
These issues are discussed further below when discussions 
turned to the UK country situation. 
Turning to the issue of serious and less serious crimes or acts 
under 1F, it was suggested that there is a clear balancing act that 
needs to be clarified at the national level. Jurisprudence around 
the world on this issue is muddled at best. One approach could 
be to use the definition of serious crime as set out in the Rome 
Statute of the ICC (although that definition was never meant to 
be prescriptive). It is however possible that States do not want 
to address these issues (i.e. the vagueness is deliberate), as it 
may create new issues and problems when seeking to exclude 
individuals under 1F and the consequent State measures 
adopted thereafter.
The discussion then turned to discuss the Netherlands country 
situation in more detail. It was noted that the ‘entry ban’ in 
the Netherlands came into the force at the same time as the 
EU Returns Directive. It can be imposed when a person has no 
legal right to remain and has to leave the country or has not 
left within the designated period. The ban, though usually of 
a duration of five years, can be extended to 20 years under 
the Aliens Act by a responsible minister if it is considered that 
the person poses a serious threat to public order or national 
security (this is classed as a ‘heavy’ entry ban). 
The risk of further criminality perpetrated by 1F-excluded 
persons was acknowledged. However if this is seen in the 
context of particular populations in Europe the danger posed 
by these individuals is small. In the Netherlands, Afghan 
1F-excluded persons live with and are supported by their family 
and generally wish to avoid all contact with the State for fear 
of future problems relating to their irregular status. It was 
suggested that the risk of future criminality was a major driver 
behind the push for the restrictive leave policy in the UK, as it 
was an attempt to avoid driving people underground. Similar 
to the experience in the Netherlands, when public funds were 
removed from supporting 1F-excluded persons in the UK there 
was no backlash as they relied on the support of their families. 
However, it is still possible to access some public funds if the 
case for destitution can be made.
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Session 4: Practice of European States, civil law jurisdictions II 
The situation of undesirable/unreturnable migrants in 
Norway 
Professor Terje Einarsen, University of Bergen, Norway and Mi 
Hanne Christiansen, Norwegian Directorate of Immigration  
In Norway unreturnables fit into two categories, persons 
who are prevented from being returned for legal reasons and 
persons who are prevented from being returned for practical 
reasons. Unlike the Netherlands however, Norway includes 
before excludes, meaning asylum seekers are assessed for 
refugee status inclusion before they are assessed under Article 
1F for exclusion. Currently there are 118 persons in Norway 
who have been excluded under Article 1F but have a bar on 
return to their home states for legal reasons. These persons 
are either given a limited-stay permit or no permit at all. The 
number of Article 1F UBUs has increased in recent times by 
about 10 per year. These individuals can be given a permit for 
very limited periods (renewal every seven months is common, 
which involves an application process each time) as a means of 
the government keeping track of them. While these individuals 
are excluded from ever applying for a permanent permit or 
citizenship, if they arrive with family members the family 
members can apply for asylum in their own right (although the 
person cannot request family reunification if family members 
are abroad). There is a small number who receive no permit at 
all and these are seen as serious security risk cases.
Since new legislation was adopted in 2008, UBUs who have 
remained in Norway for a specific length of time can now apply 
for leave to stay on humanitarian grounds, although this has 
not yet been exercised in practice. 
Two elements of the UBU situation were then discussed in 
more detail. First, in relation to undesirability, the experience in 
Norway is that just because a person is excluded under 1F does 
not mean they will cause problems or issues for the State. The 
majority of people live perfectly quiet lives. 
In relation to data, of all the asylum seekers or refugees in 
Norway, about two per cent of that population go on to commit 
crimes in Norway, which for Norway is a significant number. Of 
the 100 persons who have been excluded under 1F, five (5 per 
cent) were persons who committed crimes after they arrived 
(mainly drugs or violence related offences).
Moving onto the unreturnable element, since the beginning of 
the current refugee crisis new measures have been put in place, 
which have had the knock-on effect of creating more people 
who are now deemed to be unreturnable. For example, until 
recently everyone granted protection was considered to be 
a refugee, but Norway is now introducing limited permits for 
Article 3 ECHR-type protection, which limits the status granted 
to individuals and appears to be a form of subsidiary protection 
as exists under the EU Qualification Directive. The presentation 
concluded by noting a great deal of things will be happening in 
relation to UBUs in the near future and it remains to be seen 
how the situation will develop.
Undesirable and unreturnable: a case study of Italy 
Dr Marco Odello, Aberystwyth University, UK  
Dr Odello discussed the issue of UBUs in the context of Italy, 
focusing on persons who have been 1F-excluded. He started by 
observing the lack of published cases in Italy, although whether 
this means the issue is small or simply not being made public is 
unclear.  
Using information obtained from the Refugee Council in Italy, 
Dr Odello noted that there were 79,000 applications in 2015 for 
refugee status in Italy. Of that number, five per cent received 
refugee status, 15 per cent subsidiary protection and 22 per 
cent humanitarian protection. This however leaves a missing or 
ignored 16 per cent and it remains unclear what has happened 
to these applicants.
There is a criminalisation of migration policy in Italy, with 
reactions of the press and public informing government policy. 
This securitisation approach has increased in intensity since 
the 2000s, when people started to come through Italy in larger 
numbers, using Italy as a transit country in the hope of settling 
in Northern Europe. 
Dr Odello discussed the legal framework in Italy before 
looking at expulsion in more detail. The Italian authorities 
use a combination of the Criminal Code and Immigration law 
to remove people from the territory. Article 10 of the Italian 
Constitution defines asylum broadly, yet there is no specific law 
in relation to the asylum process. The last attempted proposal 
to incorporate the Article 10 into immigration law was made in 
2001 but did not reach the final stages of approval in Parliament. 
However, in practice high courts in Italy have used Article 10 of 
the Constitution as a basis for considering asylum claims.
The Immigration laws (1990 and 1998) both attempted to 
organise ways of dealing with different groups of immigrants, 
with varying degrees of success. In 2002 further legal changes 
tightened access to immigration status and procedures 
and increased the criminalisation of people entering the 
country. These new laws were challenged in 2007 before the 
Constitutional Court, but the Court held the law does not 
violate the Constitution (for example detention of two to four 
years if people ignore expulsion orders). 
Turning to expulsions, there are two main types under Italian 
law, (i) Administrative Expulsion – through a representative of 
the government at the local level; and (ii) Judicial Expulsion 
– through an order made by a judge. There is a long list of 
activities that may lead to expulsion – most recently crimes 
against democratic organizations inside or outside Italy have 
been added.
Prohibition of expulsion in Italian law comes from the Migration 
Law 1998, which has similar clauses to the 1951 Refugee 
Convention in relation to non-refoulement. In these cases, the 
authorities usually issue a residence permit for humanitarian 
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reasons. Expulsion can also be stopped for other reasons such 
as the presence of family members in Italy or if the expellee is 
pregnant or within six months of giving birth. 
Dr Odello then highlighted some important cases in relation to 
Italy and UBUs. First, in the famous case of Öcalan, a Turkish man 
who founded the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) found himself in 
Italy after moving through several countries. He gave himself up 
to police in Italy. Although he had a number of arrest warrants 
against him in countries including Turkey and West Germany, 
Italy could not extradite Öcalan to Turkey as the death penalty 
was still in place, and Germany for internal political reasons 
did not request extradition. Eventually Italy convinced Öcalan 
to leave the country ‘spontaneously’ and he flew to Kenya, 
where Turkish intelligence picked him up. Italy here sought to 
subvert its non-refoulement obligations Additionally, Italy has 
been found in breach of Article 3 and Article 34 of the ECHR 
in separate cases when (i) returning a Tunisian citizen back to 
Tunisia to face inhumane and degrading treatment (the Saadi 
case) and (ii) the expulsion of another Tunisian while a decision 
by the ECtHR on his case was pending (Ben Khemais). 
Dr Odello concluded by noting that while data was patchy, 
Italy showed a trend towards expanding the definition of 
undesirables and the practice of expulsion. For example, new 
provisions now allow local authorities to expel undesirable 
migrants. There are also problems with the ability of individuals 
to appeal expulsion decisions and inconsistences in how the 
matter is dealt with between the administrative and judicial 
courts, resulting in conflicting outputs being generated. 
The indefinite detention of undesirable and unreturnable 
third country nationals in Greece  
Dr Eleni Koutsouraki, Panteion University, Greece  
As the current refugee crisis continues unabated, it was 
particularly pertinent to hear from Dr Koutsouraki on how Greece 
is responding to this issue of UBUs. In Greece, undesirables are 
those who are considered dangerous to national security and 
public order (although in the current climate it appears any 
undocumented persons not in need of international protection 
are considered to be undesirable). As seen with other countries, 
UBUs are broken down into two groups, those who cannot be 
returned because they need international protection and those 
who cannot be returned for practical reasons. 
Similar to other country reports, Dr Koutsouraki noted problems 
with obtaining up-to-date data, with the Greek authorities 
stating it is impossible to estimate the total number of UBUs in 
Greece as the different computer systems used in the regional 
Directorates of the Hellenic Police are not connected to a 
central database. 
The legal framework of detention in Greece is more or less a 
replication of the EU Return Directive. There is however an 
added ground on those who are considered to pose a danger 
to national security which amounts to a violation of EU Law. 
However in light of events over the last year, such as the 
election of a new government, this could change. 
There are a number of problems with the current legal 
framework relating to UBUs. First, there is the possibility 
that unreturnables could remain in detention indefinitely, for 
example in cases of non-cooperation with ‘voluntary’ return. 
In 2014, the Greek police issued decisions of ‘mandatory 
residence’ in detention centres for those third country 
nationals who had not been returned within 18 months. While 
the new government has striven to eliminate this approach, 
a Ministerial Decision allowing for administrative detention 
beyond 18 months is still currently valid. 
Second, all third country nationals who do not have a legal 
permit to remain in Greece are subject to administrative 
detention without an individual assessment of their case. 
Currently, detention is used for those apprehended at the 
border with Turkey as well as in the territory but not in the 
Greek Islands, although this might change soon. 
Third, detention centres are used excessively for persons who 
are deemed to be a danger to public order or national security. 
The police authorities have been resorting to ‘legitimizing 
reasons’ for detaining persons, which means using prior 
prosecutions or earlier custodial sentences as justification for 
detention. In fact the Greek Ombudsman has noted there is a 
great deal confusion among police as to the categorisation of 
aliens and the legal systems these different groups fall within. 
Fourth, another indicator as to how detention has become 
an objective of the Greek authorities was the issuing of 
detention orders on the grounds of ‘dangerosity’ to third 
country nationals arrested in ‘drug trafficking areas’ during 
2014, without consideration of other factors. Alarmingly, the 
Greek Ombudsman noted that this appeared to be directed 
at persons with specific ethnic characteristics who were also 
unreturnable. 
Fifth, if a detainee wishes to make a legal challenge to their 
detention before the administrative courts, it is considered by 
the President of the court rather than by court composition. 
With no right to appeal and no legal aid available it is 
unsurprising that the ECtHR has viewed this as an ineffective 
remedy. 
Dr Koutsouraki ended her discussion by looking at potential 
solutions to the issues raised. First and foremost there is an 
urgent need for better data collection in order to estimate the 
true scale of the problem. It is also clear that the implementation 
of administrative detention provisions concerning UBUs is 
unlawful and so new internal regulations are needed to be used 
by the police. Furthermore there is also a need for an effective 
legal remedy. Genuine voluntary returns, review of detention 
and alternatives to detention should all be considered. For 
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example, Greece could apply projects similar to the UK’s 
‘Community Support Project’ and also issue residence permits 
for tolerated stay. 
Finally it should not be forgotten that Greece, as a ‘gateway’ to 
Europe, needs to be viewed in the context of the larger context 
of Europe’s inability to manage mixed migration flows. 
Fourth panel discussion
The discussions began with a debate surrounding who we see 
as UBUs and how this affects our discussion of State responses. 
It was suggested that throughout the day the grounds for 
defining persons as ‘undesirable’ has become broader, resulting 
in a need to look again at the group of people currently being 
defined as UBUs. However solutions become incredibly complex 
if you include all such groups. It was also suggested that it is best 
to focus discussions on persons who have committed serious 
crimes. Finally, while in legal terms there are clear distinctions 
between 1F-excluded persons and persons who commit crimes 
when in the host country, in practice if a person is unreturnable 
there is not a great difference between these groups of people, 
as the end result is the same. 
The discussion then turned to the individual states discussed 
by the panel. The approach of Norway whereby UBUs can gain 
even a limited status is in stark contrast to some countries in 
the EU, particularly in comparison to Greece where all aliens 
are currently seen as undesirable (on a practical level there is 
simply not the capacity to assist aliens with social benefits). 
Greece also has great problems returning persons due to a 
lack of cooperation among other States and in its current plight 
Greece is not in a strong position to broker bilateral agreements. 
In Italy the use of both administrative procedures and criminal 
and civil procedures creates confusion and revisions of 
decisions. Furthermore, administrative expulsions for public 
security reasons in Italy are carried out without a trial. The 
response in Italy was also discussed in the context of Frontex 
(the European Agency for the Management of Operational 
Cooperation at the External Borders). It was suggested that 
Frontex are now intercepting persons at the Italian border and 
deciding on the spot whether the person should be entered into 
the asylum system – i.e. be allowed to apply for refugee status 
or turned back. Some are turned away purely on nationality, 
due to bilateral agreements signed with the home State. This 
approach is not being replicated in Greece although it can be 
difficult to gain access to the asylum system in practice. Many 
Tunisian, Algerian and Moroccan nationals are picked up on the 
islands and sent to detention centres for removal but can apply 
for asylum once they are in detention. Somewhat ironically it 
is actually easier to apply for asylum in Greece once you have 
been detained. 
Looking specifically at expulsions, in the US expulsions are 
used for relatively minor crimes (such as drug possession) and 
employed even where people who have permanent residence. 
Therefore by comparison to the European cases presented 
today, the US approach seems extreme. Professor Rebecca 
Sharpless will discuss this further below. 
Discussions concluded with the organisers noting some 
key questions that the discussions had raised and could be 
addressed on day two:
• The scope of the project: undesirable and unreturnables 
may be part of a broader group of immigrants that are 
in legal limbo. Is it therefore important to broaden the 
scope and have more defined categories?
• Is there an endpoint or backstop to temporary permits/
stays? Is there the potential for one? Is there a limit to the 
number of times temporary permits can be renewed?
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Day Two
Day two began by reviewing the discussions, questions and thematic issues raised during the opening day’s talks. These included: 
i) How broad is the scope of this conference? Is there something specific about UBUs as defined on the first day, or are 
we actually talking about the broader issue of unreturnable migrants in general? If we decide that we are not talking 
about unreturnability in general, then what makes the selected groups of persons accused of crimes so special? And 
what type of criminality are we talking about, only ‘serious’ criminality or any form of criminality? Are we in particular 
talking about persons excluded on the basis of Article 1F of the 1951 Refugee Convention or also other groups?
ii) What are we talking about in terms of responses? Discussions on day one focused on deportation, prosecution, 
extradition, diplomatic assurances and house arrests. Are we talking here about policy responses or (harmonized) 
policy solutions, or a mix of both?
iii) The issue of the temporality of current solutions. A great deal of the State responses discussed have, in practice, a 
very short-term focus. While sometimes this is needed, is there also a need to consider solutions and responses in 
the medium-term and long-term? 
Session 5: Approaches in common law jurisdictions (UK/Australia) 
Country report: Australia
Professor Satvinder Juss, King’s College London, UK  
Professor Juss began the first session by looking at the country 
situation in Australia in relation to UBUs. He noted that case law 
makes it difficult to distinguish undesirable and unreturnable 
migrants in terms of 1F-excluded persons, stateless people and 
terrorism suspects. 
First, he looked at the case of Al-Kateb v Godwin, which involved 
a Palestinian man who was refused a visa but could not be 
removed as he was stateless. He was placed in a migration 
detention centre and the High Court controversially stated that 
under the Migration Act he could be held indefinitely. 
The cases of M47 and M76, while not resolving the issue of 
indefinite detention, both stated that detention is acceptable 
for the length of administrative processes associated with 
determining whether an asylum seeker should be granted 
status or removed. The Migration Amendment Bill 2013 
addressed issues raised in the cases of M47 and M76 in relation 
to inconsistencies and suggested an independent review 
process should be implemented.
Both MMM et al. and FKAG et al. involved the unilateral 
application of the exclusion clauses and indefinite detention 
based on a ‘security assessment’. Decisions relating to security 
in Australia therefore appear to overrule decisions on refugee 
status. Between January 2010 and 2012, the Australian Security 
and Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) issued over 50 Adverse 
Security Assessments on mainly Tamil asylum seekers who 
arrived via boat. All were found to have a well-founded fear 
of persecution under the 1951 Refugee Convention, none 
were excluded under 1F, yet all have been held in indefinite 
detention, often without access to legal remedies. 
In practice, even if persons are recognised by the authorities 
as refugees, they still have to be assessed within an ASIO 
framework to determine whether they will be granted a legal 
status. The framework involves a risk assessment to determine 
if the person is a risk to national security. The standard of 
proof is much lower than that used for 1F exclusion under the 
Refugee Convention. 
There are many issues with these practices: (i) inefficient 
reasoning given for the decision to detain; (ii) most of the 
people fleeing Sri Lanka are low level in the LTTE organisation. 
While one may assume the government has found a link 
between the alleged roles of the individuals negatively assessed 
and the threat they pose to Australia, this is actually unknown. 
Furthermore, UNHCR noted that the Australian government 
should be careful that they are not detaining low-level members; 
(iii) the decisions appear to be a form of group-based decision 
on boat people from Sri Lanka; (iv) there is also a political 
limb to this approach, namely punishing unlawful arrivals to 
Australia; and (v) the UN Human Rights Committee found that 
these forms of arbitrary detention in Australia are contrary to 
international law as detention has to be proportional.
Have there been any improvements? In 2012, the periodic 
independent review of ASIO’s adverse security assessments 
of refugees was commissioned. While there has been some 
improvement since this time, decisions are still not reviewable 
and so are ultimately beyond the rule of law.
In January 2015, a group of refugees who had received negative 
security assessments saw their decisions reversed by ASIO and 
were released. Some had been in detention for more than five 
years without being charged with a crime. However, a lack of 
transparency still prevails. In his concluding remarks, Professor 
Juss noted that a key issue today in Australia is that international 
human rights law has not been incorporated into domestic law. 
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Undesirable and unreturnable in the United Kingdom 
Dr Sarah Singer, Refugee Law Initiative, University of London, 
UK  
The issue of UBUs is very high on the political and media agenda 
in the UK. However, it is very difficult to obtain data on these 
people, and Freedom of Information requests may be refused 
by the Home Office.
Dr Singer outlined the issues surrounding the two types of 
undesirables in the UK (Foreign National Offenders (FNOs) and 
1F-excluded persons). Taking FNOs first, namely those who 
have been convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment 
in the UK, this group amounts to around 13/14 per cent of the 
UK prison population. The primary policy in relation to FNOs is 
removal at the earliest opportunity. In the year 2014-15 5,591 
were removed. The figures have broadly remained similar since 
2008. All forms of criminality can trigger removal proceedings 
(even petty criminals). 
Notwithstanding a considerable increase in the number of staff 
in the Home Office that deal with removals (and the amount 
of money spent on this issue, which is estimated to be £800 
million in 2013–14), the rate of removals has not significantly 
increased. 
The problems the UK faces in seeking to remove UBUs are similar 
to those faced by other countries discussed at this conference. 
They range from restrictions imposed by Article 3 and 8 of the 
ECHR, EU law, specific restrictions on extradition, obtaining 
travel documents, cooperation from foreign governments, to 
administrative problems within the Department itself. 
The UK government has attempted to overcome these 
problems with a variety of approaches: i) attempting to modify 
the ECtHR approach to Article 3; ii) entering into MoUs with 
third countries such as Ethiopia, Jordan and Lebanon; and 
iii) altering the domestic interpretation of Article 8 (private 
and family life) through Immigration Rules and later through 
primary legislation. In 2014, new legislation set out the ‘correct’ 
interpretation of Article 8, stating that removal of FNOs is in the 
public interest and effectively set out a sliding scale by which 
the more serious the crime, the more removal of the individual 
is in the public interest; and (iv) the ‘deport now, appeal later’ 
approach, which means that deportees are only allowed to 
appeal once they have been deported to their home state 
(though there are exceptions in respect of serious risk of harm 
if removed). 
In relation to administrative problems, it seems that many cases 
of unreturnability stem from issues related to Emergency Travel 
Documents (ETD), which are needed from the relevant home 
state or third state embassy. Recent reports have shown that 
thousands of ETDs have been issued by embassies but then 
ignored by the Home Office. Since 2013 a cross-department 
action plan is in place and things have begun to improve. 
Current figures suggest there are currently 5,500 FNOs left 
in the UK whom the government is trying to remove. There 
are currently two responses to FNOs who are waiting to be 
removed or who are unremovable. The first response is to 
grant temporary admission on bail where restrictions can 
be imposed such as on residence. The second response is 
detention. According to common law principles, an individual 
should not be left in detention unless there is a reasonable 
prospect of removal. However in practice courts have found 
that detention for years may be considered reasonable. The 
obvious downsides to the latter policy response are the costs 
to the taxpayer and the human rights implications of long-term 
detention. 
The second type of UBUs in the UK are 1F-excluded persons. 
While exclusions have increased in the last decade, the 
provision is still seldom used and amounts to only one per cent 
of decisions by the Home Office (although this data only relates 
to initial decisions and not when 1F is raised in an appeal or 
to revoke refugee status). Statistics show that Zimbabwe, 
Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Iraq and Libya are the main nationalities 
of exclusions and these individuals are mainly excluded under 
Article 1F(a)for suspected commission of war crimes or crimes 
against humanity.
Regarding post-exclusion, the preferred response is to seek 
removal, but domestic and international human rights law often 
bar this. The same is also applies to extraditions. As discussed in 
a previous session, the government has attempted to appease 
human rights issues in regards to extraditions by adopting 
MoUs with third states to guarantee issues such as fair trial. 
Another option is prosecution and the UK has the obligation to 
prosecute certain crimes, but on a practical level it can prove 
difficult, unfeasible and extremely expensive. 
In light of the challenges to removal another option is for 
1F-excluded persons to remain in the UK. In September 
2011, the UK initiated the Restricted Leave (RL) policy, which 
means leave is given for six months periods with possible 
restrictions on employment, education and access to public 
funds. 1F-excluded persons granted restricted leave are placed 
under close scrutiny with the aim of making the experience as 
uncomfortable as possible. This is to avoid strong ties to the 
UK being made, which could trigger a claim under Article 8 of 
the ECHR (right to family life). In 2014, there were 56 people 
on restricted leave and while there have been a number of 
challenges under Article 8, in general the UK Courts have 
been reluctant to decide restricted leave is a disproportionate 
interference with Article 8 rights. Furthermore, the courts have 
been unwilling to give specific time limits after which the UK 
will need to grant these individuals leave to remain. 
Dr Sarah Singer concluded by reiterating that UBUs are high on 
the political and media agenda in the UK, with a strong focus 
on removal. However the reality is that many people who are 
unable to be returned or extradited are left in limbo with no 
viable solution. Therefore there is a need to explore alternative 
long term responses to this issue.
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Undesirable, unreturnable and no effective remedy: UK 
country report 
 Sheona York, Kent Law Clinic, University of Kent, UK  
The presentation looked at the UK from the perspective of 
undesirables with a criminal history, whether or not that meets 
the formal definition of a ‘foreign criminal’; and unreturnables 
who cannot be removed from the UK.
Sheona York introduced her talk by discussing the 2014 UK 
Immigration Act and the themes within it. The whole tone of 
the Act sets in place Home Secretary Theresa May’s intention 
to create a ‘hostile environment’ with measures aimed at 
dissuading illegal immigrants to stay. For example, Section 117 
states that the deportation of foreign criminals is in the public 
interest and doesn’t allow for a person to appeal from inside 
the UK unless they would face a real risk of serious irreversible 
harm if removed. 
Sheona York then focused on whether it was time to re-examine 
how Articles 6 and 7 ECHR could be applied to immigration cases. 
For example, the use of the present tense (i.e. deportation is in 
the public interest) in the 2014 UK Immigration Act suggests 
that past crimes can also be considered, which in Sheona 
York’s opinion could amount to the imposition of retrospective 
criminal penalties in breach of Article 7 ECHR and/or denial of a 
fair trial in breach of Article 6 ECHR. 
In the case of Maaouia v France, the ECtHR confirmed the 
exclusion of immigration law from the scope of Articles 6 
and 7 ECHR, reasoning that immigration control is a purely 
administrative matter subject to only public law challenge. 
The Court in Maaouia v France also stated that Article 6 could 
not be applied to immigration measures because an expellee 
has recourse to the guarantees contained within Article 1 of 
Protocol 7, relating to proceedings for the expulsion of aliens. 
These guarantees are the protections given in Articles 3, 8 
and 13 of the ECHR. However as Sheona York noted, Article 1 
of Protocol 7 only applies to those ‘lawfully resident’ on the 
territory. Under UK law a decision to deport removes this 
residency and by doing so also removes the right to protection 
under Articles 3, 8 and 13 of the ECHR. Sir Nicholas Bratza in a 
concurring judgment suggested that there might be examples 
where immigration measures could trigger Article 6. For these 
reasons it might be time to revisit the reasoning in the Maaouia 
v France case.
Turning briefly to common law remedies for supposed breaches 
of Article 7 EHCR, Sheona York raised the issue of double 
jeopardy (autrefois acquit) – protecting someone from being 
tried twice for the same offence. She argued that a person 
facing deportation because of a past criminal conviction (which 
was not acted upon by the Home Office at the time of the 
conviction) effectively means the person is facing a second 
penalty for the same offence. According to the legal principle 
of res judicata (the offence itself) a person may be prosecuted 
for other offences arising out of the same set of facts but the 
punishment on any further convictions must reflect the harm 
done and not simply punish the same conduct twice. 
Sheona York then moved on to discuss the weakening of the 
burden and standard of proof in criminal cases by discussing 
two recent upper tribunal cases regarding deportation and 
removal, which focused on criminal charges but no criminal 
conviction. The first one, Bah (EO Turkey), involved a man who 
had not been prosecuted for any crime, but the tribunal used 
police evidence to determine that he probably had committed 
the offences in question, and on this basis his deportation 
appeal was dismissed. In Farquharson a man facing removal 
after being suspected of several rapes was found guilty and 
deported by a tribunal even though he did not have access to 
the witness statements or cross-examination. Both these cases 
seem to show that criminality was decided by immigration 
tribunals without a fair criminal trial. 
Moving to case law surrounding unreturnability, the House 
of Lords in the Khadir case stated that a person could be kept 
on temporary admission with no time limit to detention – as 
long as the Home Office has the intention to remove them. 
However the Khadir case also showed that if it becomes ‘simply 
impossible’ to remove then ‘it may be irrational’ not to grant 
leave (commonly referred to as the ‘Hale threshold’). In MS, 
AR & FW, the Court of Appeal suggested that in ‘particular 
factual difficulties’ it may ‘not be inconceivable’ that the ‘Hale 
threshold’ has been reached. Finally, the case of MA showed 
that an applicant must take all reasonable steps in good faith to 
establish her nationality, and the test of inability to return is to 
be proved on the balance of probabilities. 
Finally, Sheona York highlighted the curious situation of 
credibility in cases of unreturnablilty. Once someone has been 
deemed to be un-credible, it then stands to reason the same 
person cannot claim to be unreturnable (as any evidence given 
about a country of origin must be by definition unreliable). 
Furthermore, once you state a person is un-credible by the 
same logic it is impossible to return them because you do not 
know where they came from. Yet the Home Office gives the 
impression that it is reluctant to accept that removal is ever 
impossible even in situations of (un)credibility. 
In conclusion it is clear the new UK immigration bill has added 
to the intense and hostile environment migrants and UBUs face 
in the UK. Further analysis and litigation is needed in relation to 
the ‘Hale Threshold’ along with a re-examination of Maaouia. 
One further avenue of enquiry could be to adopt the approach 
raised by Limbuela (Adam, R (on the application of) v. Secretary 
of State for the Home Department, where the denial of support 
for asylum seekers that results in homelessness and destitution 
may breach Article 3 ECHR. Perhaps similar arguments could be 
raised for persons who are unable to be removed.
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Fifth panel discussion
The discussion began by considering how the Australian 
government justifies its position in relation to detention 
after the UN Human Rights Committee determined this was 
arbitrary detention and inhumane treatment. In response, 
the government has said it bases its approach on a different 
interpretation of its human rights obligations. The treatment of 
international law in Australia is hostile, for example international 
refugee law has been removed from national law and new 
provisions do not reference the 1951 Refugee Convention. As 
mentioned before, a key problem is the lack of domestic human 
rights law protection.
It appeared to one participant, that with the introduction of 
more restrictive immigration bills, Australia is moving migration 
controls inwards from the borders, meaning control is no longer 
simply about traditionally stopping people crossing into the 
territory but also removing them from inside the state. 
A second discussion focused on whether Article 7 of ECHR 
should be applied to immigration cases. Some participants 
argued that deportation itself is not a criminal penalty. However, 
there may be more flexibility in relation to exclusion cases by 
relying on Article 6 of ECHR in conjunction with Article 24 of 
the ICCPR regarding access to fail trial (which is even broader 
in the ICCPR). Even this is tricky, however, as the Human Rights 
Committee’s General Comment on Article 14 states that it 
should not be applied to deportation cases. A recent Court of 
Appeal decision in the UK did discuss the implications of the 
Maaouia case and while it ultimately decided that there was 
no right to engage Article 6, the court did at least engage with 
the question. Others took a stronger view, suggesting that the 
assertion that immigration is an administrative process, so not 
related to political and criminal rights, should be challenged. If 
homelessness can activate Article 6 then there is a discretionary 
element to this right that should be investigated. The Maaouia 
case was decided over 15 years ago, and so it is time to 
readdress these issues.
It was also suggested that the ECHtR does not wish to apply 
Article 6 and 7 in the Maaouia case, as it might be accused of 
encroaching on sovereignty issues and Member States’ right 
to control their borders. Because the issue is too political it is 
unlikely that a solution will come from the ECtHR. 
Finally on this point, refugee cases trigger international law 
through the 1951 Refugee Convention, and so perhaps it is 
easier to apply Article 6 of the ECHR in these cases as we are 
clearly dealing with international rights and law. It is possible 
this avenue may prove to be beneficial in the future. 
The cost of detaining persons for years was also discussed. 
Participants wondered at the rationale behind long-term 
detention and the expenses involved. For example, it costs the 
UK government around £30,000 a year to detain someone. 
However, it is clear the Home Office is afraid of making 
concessions that may appear to be a pull factor for other 
migrants. At the same time, this logic of this approach was also 
questioned – i.e. it is unclear how much influence individual 
cases/decisions have on migrant or refugee movement. 
It was suggested that practices at the Home Office have 
improved in recent years. Refugee claims are generally refused 
for the correct reasons and on the whole the quality of asylum 
decisions has improved. This suggestion created a lively 
debate and disagreement, with some suggesting many asylum 
decisions are still based on the opinion of the judge, which 
creates inconsistency. At the same time, it was argued, it is not 
necessarily a bad thing when a judge expresses an opinion, if it 
is based on prior knowledge. 
As the session was concluding, it was noted that procedural 
rights in the two countries (Australia and the UK) are actively 
being curtailed, with the UK trying to strip or stop the use of 
human rights law and Australia simply ignoring it. 
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Session 6: Approaches in common law jurisdictions (North America) 
Country report: Canada
Professor Jennifer Bond, University of Ottawa, Canada2  
Professor Bond presented her paper on Canada’s response 
to UBUs. Canada’s Immigration and Refugee Act (IRPA) 
incorporates Article 1F of the 1951 Refugee Convention with 
a series of ‘inadmissibility’ provisions which concern crime 
(Articles 34–37). These ‘inadmissibility’ provisions relate to all 
non-citizens and each provision deals with many identical acts, 
meaning there can be overlap between the schemes. 
In the recent past Canada has been a harsh environment for 
UBUs, however rhetoric from the new government both in 
regards to criminal non-nationals and to refugees in general 
may signal a change in policy. It will however take time to see if 
this rhetoric is translated into legal change. 
There are six potential bars to removal which are a mix of legal 
and practical reasons: i) personalised risk in the country of 
origin; ii) generalised risk in the country of origin; iii) uncertain 
identity and/or country of origin; iv) statelessness; v) refusal 
of the country of origin to repatriate; and vi) refusal to sign a 
declaration necessary for removal to Somalia.
In relation to these potential bars to removal, there are a 
number of decision-making mechanisms relevant to individuals 
who are deemed unreturnable. First there is the Pre-Removal 
Risk Assessment (PRRA), which allows individuals facing 
removal to seek protection based on an individualised risk they 
would face on return. Until recently everyone facing removal 
had access to a PRRA, but recently those who have had a 
negative refugee decision or PRRA decision in the previous 12 
months are barred from the process. A PRRA-1 assesses risk 
in relation to prosecution contained within Article 1F of the 
1951 Refugee Convention. PRRA-2 assesses the same risk but 
also has a ‘danger opinion’ which involves the risk or danger 
involved if the person remains in Canada. PRRA-3 only deals 
with risk of torture, death and cruel and unusual treatment 
or punishment but is also subject to a danger opinion. Other 
mechanisms include: Temporary Suspension of Removal which 
is a blanket ban on removal to certain countries; Humanitarian 
and compassionate applications; Temporary residence permits; 
and Ministerial discretion.
Professor Bond then showed a number of detailed charts, 
which mapped out the different obstacles and bars to risk 
assessment mechanisms for individuals suspected of certain 
types of crimes. For example, an individual cannot be assessed 
under PRRA-1 if they are deemed to have committed a serious 
crime. However, the new administration may amend some of 
these bars. 
2 Professor Jennifer Bond was speaking in relation to her academic 
work at the University of Ottawa and was not expressing the views of the 
Canadian Government. 
She then turned to possible outcomes of the decision-making 
mechanisms and through a number of charts illustrated that 
there is the possibility of a large number of different outcomes 
depending on the mechanism applied. Five key outcomes for 
UBUs are: i) permanent residence (PR); ii) temporary stay of 
removal; iii) temporary stay while simultaneously under active 
removal order; iv) placed in legal limbo with no particular status; 
and v) deportation despite apparent impediment to removal. 
In reality most UBUs get a temporary status but no access to PR. 
Those who are not eligible for PR and deemed to be a security 
concern or a flight risk, will likely be placed in detention. In 2012, 
Canada held 9,571 people in immigration detention centres. 
Once released, house arrest, electronic monitoring devices 
and restrictions on movement are often used. Furthermore, for 
persons not eligible for PR there are a number of restrictions 
and barriers to employment and access to health services 
(although this has improved in recent times). 
Professor Bond concluded by noting the pressure on policy 
makers is different in Canada than certain countries in the 
South and in Europe, as Canada’s intake of refugees is primarily 
based on resettlement quotas. 
Deportation and detention in the US: human rights principles 
and the treatment of unreturnable migrants 
Professor Rebecca Sharpless, University of Miami School of 
Law, USA  
Professor Sharpless introduced the country report on the US by 
noting that, unlike many countries discussed at the conference, 
the US does not apply Article 1F of the 1951 Refugee Convention. 
Instead there are three tiers of bars to removal: (i) asylum, 
which as the top tier can turn into residency and citizenship but 
is discretionary even if a person meets definition of ‘refugee’ 
as contained in the 1951 Refugee Convention; (ii) withholding 
of removal, which is seen as a minimum compliance to non-
refoulement. It grants permanent status to individuals but does 
not include family members, cannot be turned into residency 
and travel abroad is not permitted unless a refugee document 
is issued; and (iii) deferral of removal based on Article 3 of the 
Convention against Torture (CAT), which only applies when 
there is a risk of torture not inhumane treatment. 
While many apply for protection remedies as a way to avoid 
deportation, a criminal conviction will bar you from the top two 
tiers. Therefore, ‘particularly serious crimes’ do not qualify for 
withholding of removal and the US interpretation of particularly 
serious crimes is much broader than the international definition, 
meaning non-simple possession drug crimes, aggravated 
battery or burglary can be sufficient to disqualify a person from 
the withholding of removal. 
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Turning to exclusion grounds, Professor Sharpless noted 
asylum seekers could be excluded on the grounds of national 
security. Since the terror attacks on September 11, 2001, the 
link between migration and terrorism is seen as strong and 
so grounds for excluding people on national security reasons 
tend to be broad. For example in one case a Colombian who 
was forced to pay ‘taxes’ to the FARC before he fled his home 
state was excluded because those actions made him a ‘terrorist 
supporter’.
The immigration enforcement system in the US is massive, with 
24,000 people held in detention every day (in 1996 it was 6,600). 
At the same time as pushing immigration reform, the Obama 
Administration has been increasing deportations, with 400,000 
persons deported each year. If you are an immigrant and you 
are convicted, there is a high chance you will be deported. 
For this reason, the Supreme Court ruled that lawyers have a 
responsibility to explain the immigration consequences of a 
criminal plea to an immigrant, suggesting that deportation has 
become part of the punishment. 
Professor Sharpless focused the rest of her presentation in 
particular on those immigrants who have a criminal record and 
have been ordered to be removed under domestic law, but 
whose deportation would violate human rights law. In Smith & 
Armendariz v. U.S., the Inter-American Commission held that 
the US Immigration law of 1996 violates international law by 
not allowing an immigration judge in most cases to consider 
a petitioners right to family life and the best interests of their 
children. However, it appears the US is currently showing 
little interest in expanding domestic law in this area and 
demonstrates a reluctance to incorporate international human 
rights norms in general. 
The Supreme Court has held that if, after six months of detention, 
deportation is not foreseeable and the person has been 
cooperating with the authorities then they should be released 
under an Order of Suspension. However, the government may 
argue that there is a ‘danger exception’ to this, which has been 
invoked frequently (for example in relation to the mentally ill). 
Between 2001 and 2011, 12,567 people were released under 
an Order of Suspension. However in January 2012 almost 500 
people remained in post-removal order detention for over six 
months. A re-detention rate of seven per cent is deemed low 
by the US Immigration authorities. 
Professor Sharpless briefly touched on offshore detention 
centres, such as the facility at Guantanamo Bay, noting they are 
something akin to a secret world. In recent years the number of 
inmates has reduced, with the Obama administration publicly 
stating they wish to close the facility. While there are restrictions 
on releasing inmates from Guantanamo Bay into the US, there 
have been negotiations with third countries to remove some of 
the inmates. In addition, the US Supreme Court has ruled that 
inmates have the right to habeas corpus and so can bring claims 
in the US Federal Court. 
In relation to Haitians fleeing the earthquake in 2010, the US 
granted Temporary Protected Status (TPS) to many, but persons 
with a felony are barred from the TPS process. They would thus 
qualify for deportation. When deportations to Haiti restarted 
in January 2011, returnees were immediately detained by 
the Haitian government and the process has received a great 
deal of criticism, with one incident of a deportee dying. Since 
then there has been a balancing test to decide whether the 
deportation should occur. 
Sixth panel discussion
The discussion began by looking at the history of deportation in 
the US. It was suggested that the US could be shooting itself in 
the foot in deporting Haitians. Similar patterns occurred in the 
1990s when the US deported people back to Central America, 
which is now seen as directly affecting the proliferation of gangs 
in neighbouring countries, which in turn has produced new 
waves of forced migration to the US. In relation to the current 
deportation of Haitian nationals, it was noted that the Haitian 
government believes the US is only deporting dangerous 
criminals (hence why they are all incarcerated upon arrival) but 
in reality a great number of returnees are mentally ill or sick 
people. It was argued that the current approach seems unfair 
to the deportees and unfair to Haiti. 
A second discussion started by looking at the UNHCR Exclusion 
Guidelines of 2003, which makes clear Article 1F should 
not be confused with Article 32 and 33 of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention. It was then questioned whether Canadian and US 
domestic law conflates 1F and Article 33(2) of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention. Furthermore, it seemed as if both countries apply 
common law over international human rights law and treaties. 
In relation to Canada it was suggested that this conflation of 
33(2) and 1F in domestic legislation is problematic as under 
Refugee Status Determination processes if an asylum seeker is 
deemed inadmissible, the applicant loses the right to a refugee 
hearing. Canada uses both common law principles (including 
those relating to human rights) and international treaties. In 
the US the common law situation is complex, and the normal 
constitutional constraints for protection do not apply to 
immigration. There has been some movement but the common 
law is not generally seen as a friend of immigration.
Finally a discussion focused on the issue of teasing out active 
security risks from other normative issues such as state policy 
used to deter low risk people from attempting to remain in the 
State or even enter the State. In most states such as Canada, 
the legislation does not currently reflect this issue. 
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UBUs, especially on the grounds of humanitarian concerns, it is 
unlikely it holds many answers as political asylum in practice is 
usually reserved for very high-profile individuals. 
Professor Liliana Jubilut concluded by suggesting that in reality 
there are very few UBUs in Brazil. As it does not seem to be an 
issue, there is no real system in place to address the situation 
of UBUs. Therefore UBUs are currently left in limbo, as they 
cannot be removed but are also barred from migration or 
refugee status. Many stay as irregular migrants, living outside 
the legal system in an informal way. However it seems sensible 
to start preparing public policy for an issue that is only likely to 
increase in the future so the interests of the state and those of 
the individual can be balanced. 
Turkey: the challenging problem of ‘undesirable and 
unreturnable’ asylum seekers  
Didem Dogar, McGill University, Canada  
Didem Dogar introduced the country report on Turkey by 
commenting on the stark contrast seen with regards to UBUs 
in Turkey, compared to other EU states. Turkey currently has 2 
million refugees and is seen as a transition country to the EU. 
The presentation focused only on refugees and asylum seekers. 
As was discussed in relation to other states, data is sporadic 
at best. There are 2,291,900 registered Syrian refugees and 
115,340 registered Iraqis in Turkey but no public data is available 
on who is being excluded and/or deported. UNHCR is also not 
sharing this type of information. 
A new law on immigration was adopted in 2014 (Law on 
Foreigners and International Protection – Law 6458), which 
attempts to address the issue of UBUs although problems still 
persist. Up until that point refugees were generally rejected and 
deported on the basis of local provisions relating to national 
security and public order, however under the new law (Article 
64) there are additional excludable acts such as the commission 
of inhumane acts outside Turkey and offences defined in Article 
1F of the 1951 Convention. 
The new 2014 law relates to all migrants except Syrians, who fall 
under a special regime, the Temporary Protection Regulation. 
Article 8 of the regulations deals with exclusions and states 
that Syrians who are not granted temporary protection due to 
suspected criminality can be held in detention until removed. 
This raises clear problems in relation to non-refoulement and 
Turkey’s obligations under CAT. 
Undesirables who are prevented from being deported by 
Article 3 of the ECHR are left in a limbo situation. In the past 
Turkey has attempted to deport people even when there is 
a risk to life or torture. In Abdulkhani and Karimnia v Turkey, 
the applicants were ex-members of People’s Mojahedin 
Organisation in Iran who fled to Iraq and were recognised there 
as refugees by UNHCR. They then travelled to Turkey, were 
Undesirable and unreturnable in Brazil: refuge, exclusion and 
illegal acts 
Professor Liliana Jubilut, Universidade Católica de Santos, 
Brazil  
The conference then moved onto to discuss the situation in 
some countries in the Global South. First, Professor Jubilut 
discussed UBUs in the context of Brazil. She noted that no one 
in Brazil is talking about the issue of UBUs, with the media 
ignoring the issue and little pressure on the government to act 
in a particular way. For these reasons there is also little data (for 
example no official data on the number of expulsions per year 
or reasoning behind refused refugee cases). She then outlined 
the broad system in Brazil in relation to UBUs, starting with the 
legal framework and mechanisms for removal. 
In Brazil there is a dual legal system with regards to migration 
and refugee affairs. The outdated migration law from the 1980s 
deals with all aliens and was made during the dictatorship and 
hence shows little reference to human rights. The 1997 law 
on the other hand deals with refugees, includes the expanded 
refugee definition of the Cartagena Declaration and has been 
subsequently praised by UNHCR.
Turning to forcible removal, in Brazil there are three mechanisms: 
i) deportation, which is an administrative procedure run by the 
Federal Police. If the deportee arranges for a new visa or fixes 
the administrative issues, they will be allowed back into the 
country; ii) expulsion for crimes committed on the territory or 
threats to national security. These individuals cannot return 
unless the Minister of Justice removes the order of expulsion; 
iii) extradition – this is used when the prosecution of a crime is 
to take place outside of Brazil. 
There are two categories of UBUs in Brazil: i) foreigners who 
commit a criminal act in Brazil; and ii) excluded asylum seekers. 
However, there is no real procedure to deal with UBUs and 
alleged war criminals who have been excluded from the RSD 
process (in Brazil inclusion is considered before exclusion) are 
simply left to live out semi-clandestine lives in Brazil while, in 
theory, being able to be submitted to deportation.
One case regarding UBUs that caused an interesting public 
reaction in Brazil was that of Battisti, a convicted politically 
motivated murderer from Italy who fled to various countries 
before ending up in Brazil. He arrived as a foreigner but when he 
was about to be extradited, claimed refugee status. On appeal 
refugee protection was granted, in response Italy requested 
extradition. The Brazilian Supreme Court finally found that 
the executive branch decision to grant refugee status was 
subject to judicial review and ultimately, even though he was 
not extradited, his refugee status was revoked. Academics 
wondered at the time whether an argument could have 
been made for political asylum, which has a strong tradition 
and history in Latin America. However political asylum is 
discretionary with no inclusion criteria and based on a political 
decision. While this is an area that has not been looked at for 
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arrested and deported back to Iraq. They came back to Turkey 
a second time and requested asylum due to fear of death or ill-
treatment if they returned to Iraq. Turkey attempted to deport 
them regardless but the ECtHR reaffirmed the absolute nature 
of Article 3 (ECHR) irrespective of the actions of the person 
concerned. 
The new law on immigration has introduced a humanitarian 
residence permit, which puts a bar on removal. This is renewed 
annually and there is the option for a judicial appeal against 
negative decisions. However this permit is seen as temporary 
in nature as holders cannot apply for citizenship or long-term 
residence permits. 
Finally, there is also the issue of foreign fighters. As of December 
2015, 2,776 foreign fighters of 89 different nationalities were 
deported from Turkey. Furthermore, 33,609 foreign fighters of 
123 different nationalities were banned from entering Turkey 
as of December 2015. However, very little is known about the 
government mechanisms involved. It is unclear if there was 
due process for these people and whether the principle of non-
refoulement was violated. While this issue is not prominent in 
Turkey currently, it was suggested that this could be the source 
of future case law for the ECtHR. 
Invisible people: suspected LTTE fighters in special refugee 
camps of Tamilnadu  
Sreekumar Panicker Kodiyath, NA Palkhivala Academy of 
Advanced Legal Studies and Research, Calicut, India (co-author 
Sheethal Paadathu Veettil, Tata Institute of Social Sciences, 
Mumbai)  
Mr. Kodiyath’s talk focused on the 100,000 Sri Lankan refugees 
that have come to India due to internal conflict in Sri Lanka. 
While the treatment of Sri Lankan refugees was adequate at 
the beginning of the conflict, the situation changed after the 
terrorist attack by a suicide bomber from the Liberation Tigers 
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in 1991. After that moment two systems 
– regular camps and special camps for special refugees (people 
who were thought to be supporters of the LTTE) were set up by 
the state. The special refugees were sent to quarantine for one 
month and if they were unable to demonstrate that they were 
not a threat or involved with the LTTE, they were moved to the 
special camps.
Normally the only viable and legal way for Sri Lankans to 
leave a refugee camp is by committing to repatriation. UNHCR 
has a return program (which includes funds) to Sri Lanka 
although there are real concerns that some refugees are being 
repatriated even though the risk of suffering serious human 
rights violations upon return is high (such as torture camps).
Turning to the special camps specifically, the conditions inside 
are bad, with no family visits permitted, no permission to 
consult lawyers and appalling facilities. The special camps have 
not been inspected since 1999 and international organisations 
such as ICRC are barred for entering. There is no real legal 
framework in relation to the special camps, and India has not 
signed the 1951 Refugee Convention so all refugees are simply 
seen as foreigners. While UNHCR does have a mandate in India 
it is very limited – to assist in the return of refugees and help 
people who make it to their Delhi or Chennai office.
From the available data there were 4,000 persons in the special 
camps in 1998 but only 55–100 persons in 2009. Current data 
suggests there are now only 20–25 people left in the camps. The 
key question that remains unanswered is what happened to the 
1,000–4,000 refugees who were removed from the camps since 
1998? It is incredibly hard to find out any information on this 
from either the government or refugees themselves, particular 
when this was in the pre-mobile phone era. Whether they were 
released, deported or sent to a third country is unknown and 
the Government is currently unwilling to answer any questions 
relating to this issue. 
Finally, briefly turning to the legal framework, Section 3 of the 
Foreigners Act 1946, gives the Central Government unqualified 
power to prohibit entry, arrest, detain and expel foreigners 
without the opportunity of a hearing or appeal. Moreover, 
judicial attitude keeps changing, with huge discretion used in 
each case. However, even if a UBU is granted a stay against 
deportation, they will likely be sent back to a refugee camp. 
Mr. Kodiyath concluded by stating his desire to continue his 
research to uncover more information on what happened to 
the approx. 4,000 refugees who were removed from the special 
camps between 1998 and 2009.
Seventh panel discussion
Discussions focused on the three country reports. First, 
the political dimension of refugee settlements in India was 
discussed. During regional elections in Tamilnadu, where the 
special camps are located, some refugees and/or UBUs are 
often released from prison for political reasons as the area has 
close ethnical and cultural ties to Sri Lankan Tamils. Although 
after the elections the refugees are normally rounded up and 
detained again. 
The conversation then moved onto Special Camps. When 
UNHCR set up emergency camps in neighbouring states to 
protect refugees fleeing conflict they normally separate out 
suspected combatants and civilians, although in many situations 
the host state takes control of the camps. In Turkey, all Syrian 
camps are regulated by the government, which also separates 
suspected combatants from the general refugee population.
In relation to Turkey, it was noted that it still has a geographical 
reservation on the 1951 Refugee Convention and so does not 
officially recognise refugees coming from outside of Europe, 
however UNHCR conducts a parallel RSD process for non-
Europeans. Since 2014, the government should in theory be 
in complete control of the RSD procedure but currently there 
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is a transitional period and in practice UNCHR is still heavily 
involved in the Refugee Status Determination (RSD) procedure 
concerning non-Europeans for resettlement purposes.
Finally, in Brazil detention only occurs if a migrant commits a 
crime in the country or doesn’t leave after an order to do so. 
Brazil has also been conducting a resettlement programme 
for Colombian refugees since 2014. High-risk refugees in 
neighbouring countries to Colombia can now be resettled in 
Brazil within 72 hours.
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Refugee adjudication under the UNHCR’s statute or mandate 
and the exclusion dilemma  
Professor James C. Simeon, York University, Canada  
Professor Simeon sees refugees as the symptom of the declining 
state of ‘peace’ in the world today. Looking at the root cause of 
these forms of migration, he noted that a third of the world 
is engaged in armed conflicts that are of a protracted nature. 
Furthermore, UNHCR sees conflict as the main driver of forced 
migration today, with the trend only increasing in coming years 
to the point where we are already at a stage where the numbers 
involved are beyond the capacity of international organisations 
to cope. 
With the increase in numbers, it is reasonable to say the 
exclusion clauses based on Article 1F will become more 
and more pertinent. We are however dealing with complex 
problems and so more data and information sharing is needed 
on exclusions and how states and institutions like UNHCR deal 
with the issue. Transparency is always a good thing and UNHCR 
could start sharing more information obtained from the RSD 
process (while maintaining the anonymity of applicants). 
In relation to exclusion, Professor Simeon believes inclusion 
should be assessed before exclusion. Before you can exclude 
someone you have to first determine whether s/he is a refugee. 
In addition, it is implicit in the system that there are people who 
will be excluded and so states have to develop appropriate and 
measured ways to respond. 
As a world leader in RSD, UNHCR could take the lead and be 
more vocal on UBU issues. For example, while the 1951 Refugee 
Convention gives no direction as to RSD procedures, over time 
UNHCR has stepped in and created sets of guidelines that have 
been adopted by states. With a unit in Geneva that deals with 
exclusion (the Protection and National Security Unit) and the 
1951 Refugee Convention silent on what to do with excluded 
persons, perhaps it is time for UNHCR to develop policy or soft 
law in this area? 
Professor Simeon agreed with previous comments, suggesting 
that while policy makers need time to address these issues, 
these concerns are coming to the fore and it is better to 
consider them in advance rather than wait until they become 
overwhelming. While this conference has shown that the 
numbers of UBUs in some jurisdictions are relatively low, this 
will not likely remain the case. He concluded by noting that 
in the first instance the focus should be on rehabilitation and 
local integration of UBUs. If they are deemed to be a legitimate 
danger to the public then relocation to a third country (with 
assurances) may be necessary. However no one should be left 
in limbo.
Union law solutions for excluded persons  
Professor Hemme Battjes, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, 
Netherlands  
Professor Battjes looked at potential EU solutions to the issue 
of 1F-excluded persons with a focus on the Netherlands.
In the EU, exclusions from asylum are regulated by the Asylum 
Qualification Directive 2011/95/EU) (AQD). The question is 
whether states are allowed to adopt a balancing exercise 
when considering exclusion for asylum under the AQD. For 
example, for a relatively minor crime exclusion may have very 
grave consequences for the asylum applicant. In the case of B 
and D the European Court of Justice (ECJ) was asked whether 
exclusion from refugee status under the AQD’s equivalent of 
Article 1F of the 1951 Convention requires a proportionality 
test for each case. Furthermore, if so, should protection under 
Article 3 ECHR or national rules be taken into account when 
applying the proportionality test? This idea of proportionality 
has been put forward by UNHCR in the past, with the idea that 
the level of criminality should be balanced against other factors 
such as the consequences of exclusion for the individual. 
However the ECJ appeared to reject those arguments and the 
possibility of balancing. 
States do have the option of granting an excluded asylum 
seeker another national status outside the remit of the AQD. 
Dutch law though is very strict on 1F-excluded persons, with 
all legal status options excluded (with one exception being 
humanitarian status).
Turning to other EU law that could be applied to 1F-excluded 
persons, first there is the Family Reunification Directive 
(2003/86/EC), which sets out scenarios when an excluded 
individual may be issued a residence permit by a member state 
where a family member resides (who fulfills particular criteria). 
Second, the Citizenship Directive (2004/38/EC) may also apply 
if a spouse is an EU citizen. Both the Family Reunification 
Directive and the Citizenship Directive make no explicit 
reference to excluding 1F-excluded individuals in their grounds 
for refusing admission. However both Directives allow states to 
exclude person from a status on public order grounds. In the 
view of many (including Dutch law makers and judiciary), the 
exclusions of a person under 1F is such a public order ground.
The ECJ jurisprudence in relation to public policy and national 
security is well developed and while it gives states some 
discretion, exclusion grounds can only be applied to persons 
who pose ‘a real, present and sufficiently serious threat’. While 
the case law applies to third country national family members 
of migrated EU citizens, recent case law looked at whether 
this view on public order clauses should apply to the Family 
Reunification Directive and the Citizenship Directive.
In Zh. and O. v Staatssecretaris voor Justitie, the Dutch Court 
asked the ECJ whether a criminal conviction was sufficient 
to view an illegally present third country national as a risk to 
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public policy for the purposes of Article 7(4) Returns Directive 
(2008/115/EC). The Court said that a mere conviction is not 
enough in relation to freedom of movement cases. Rather they 
should be decided on a case-by-case basis to decide whether 
the actions of the person posed a genuine and present risk to 
public policy. In the case of H. T. v Land Baden-Württemberg, 
the ECJ was even more restrictive in its approach, stating that in 
the case of specific articles in the Citizenship Directive (again in 
relation to freedom of movement cases) the concept of public 
order refers to genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat. 
Professor Battjes saw no reason why there would be a different 
outcome in relation to the Family Reunification Directive.
The Dutch Council of State (DCS) in contrast issued a judgment 
just before the H. T. case but after the Zh. and O. case in which 
is stated that 1F(a) crimes are so serious that the threat is 
always genuine and present. The reasoning behind this came 
from Article 12(2) AQD and the ECJ case of Boucheraeu, which 
broadly stated that past conduct maybe enough to constitute a 
present threat. However Professor Battjes was not convinced 
on the ‘present threat’ argument as put forward by the DCS. It 
appears that currently in the context of 1F and public policy the 
concepts of crime and threat are taken to mean the same thing. 
Turning to the EU Returns Directive (RD), the basic approach is 
a third country national must have legal presence in the state 
or he or she has to leave (Article 6 RD). There is one exception 
– a state may grant a residence permit on compassionate or 
humanitarian grounds. If a return decision is made, then the 
state must take the necessary measures to remove the person 
(Article 8 RD). However the state must postpone this action 
if an obligation of non-refoulement applies (Article 9 (1) RD). 
Finally, the continued or indefinite presence of an individual on 
the territory without a status is clearly a grey zone between 
the obligation to remove the person and the obligation to give 
some form of legal presence. 
Article 3 ECHR prohibits the expulsion of third country nationals 
in exceptional circumstances on compelling humanitarian 
grounds (for example people close to death). In the case of 
M’Bodj the ECJ considered whether persons to whom such 
exceptional circumstances apply fall within the scope of 
subsidiary protection under the AQD. The Court stated that 
humanitarian cases are outside the scope of the AQD and 
instead states should use a national status for granting leave 
on humanitarian grounds. However, in the case of Abdida, the 
court stated that expulsion must be postponed when the EU 
Charter on Fundamental Rights (Article 19(1) – the obligation 
for a state to provide for the basic needs of a person pending 
appeal hearings) is read in line with Article 3 ECHR. In relation 
to the provision of basic needs, the ECJ noted Article 14 (1)
(b) RD requires a person to have access to emergency health 
care/essential treatment during the time a state is required to 
postpone a removal. What ‘basic needs’ means is left to states, 
but the ECHR in MSS stated food, hygiene and shelter fall within 
this concept.
While this suggests at the very least the very ill have a remedy, 
Professor Battjes queried whether the implications (particularly 
of Abdida) were wider. For example, the obligation to make 
provision for basic needs is linked to the idea of non-refoulement 
(Article 9(1)(b) RD). Article 14 of RD furthermore requires 
expulsion to be postponed as far as possible to keep families 
united, and keep children in school. These requirements cannot 
be met if no care is being taken of the family and children’s basic 
needs during the period of postponement. Finally, the Preamble 
(12) to the RD states that the basic conditions of subsistence of 
an illegal third country national cannot be denied and should be 
defined. Perhaps then there is scope within EU law for stronger 
status and rights for certain 1F-excluded persons. 
Non-removable returnees under European Union law – 
status quo and possible developments  
Mr Fabian Lutz, European Commission, Brussels  
In the EU there are 500,000 return decisions a year, with 
200,000 carried out. Of the 300,000 remaining, there are two 
main reasons for non-removal: i) non-cooperation of third 
countries or ii) non-cooperation of the returnees.
Fabian Lutz spent a good proportion of his presentation 
introducing the EU Commissions Returns Handbook, which is 
based on the RD, sets out recommendations for states and has 
potentially become a form of soft law. The Handbook suggests 
detention should be imposed for a maximum of six months 
(although in exceptional circumstances 12 or 18 moths are 
permissible). Detention should not be unlimited and should 
only be deployed if return is feasible. Therefore, detention can 
only be used for the purpose of removal; states cannot simply 
detain persons for immigration reasons (i.e. a backdoor to 
detain people who are unwanted), although domestic criminal 
law could be applied for public order offences. 
In relation to rights, Article 14 of the RD contains the basic 
rights of unreturnables, which was inspired by the Reception 
Directive’s standards in relation to asylum seekers. It does 
not include employment rights but does refer to family unity, 
emergency healthcare and minors and vulnerable people. 
EU case law has helped flesh out some of these rights. For 
example the ECJ noted that while Aids treatment is included in 
emergency healthcare, basic food subsidence also goes hand-
in-hand with this. Article 14(2) also confirms that states should 
give unreturnables paper documentation so they can show 
these to the police and avoid detention.
The RD remains silent on regularisation, although Article 6(4) 
gives states the option of granting status on humanitarian 
grounds. The ECJ has stated that the objective of the RD is 
return, not regularisation. The EU Commission sees a clear 
legal gap when UBUs are left in limbo. Responding to these 
concerns, the Commission made suggestions to member 
states, setting out 10 criteria in the Handbook, ranging from the 
level of cooperation of the returnee, the length of factual stay, 
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integration efforts made by the returnee to family links and the 
need to avoid rewarding irregularity. However, member states 
fear this sends a message to irregular migrants that there are 
ways to gain permanent status. Two years ago, the Commission 
proposed harmonization on the topic with a discussion paper 
circulated amongst states. It looked at the possibility of 
regularising people who cooperate. Again, however, there was 
unanimous rejection of this idea by member states (which in 
itself is rather unique). Member states are wary of taking on 
extra obligations, or being caught in a soft law “trap”, and so 
prefer that decisions on UBUs are kept at the national level. 
This may stem from a fear of ECtHR and ECJ case law premised 
on a rights-based approach. 
Finally, Fabian Lutz concluded by looking at what to realistically 
expect in this area in the near future. First, the use of detention 
will likely remain widespread amongst member states. The 
jurisprudence of the ECJ, however, might improve the rights 
of UBUs. The development of policies on the regularisation 
of unreturnables is unlikely even with the publication of the 
Handbook and 10-point plan. States are likely to be hesitant to 
accept new regulations from Brussels in this regard. The focus 
of states will more likely be on (i) creating incentives for return 
(a ‘red carpet’ approach including financial packages); (ii) 
alternatively, sending UBUs to third countries; and (iii) a push 
to criminalise non-cooperation of returnees. 
Eighth panel discussion
The discussion opened with a focus on UNHCR’s role. The 
organisation has expressed its opinion on when to exclude 
and when not to return but currently provides no guidance on 
what to do with these people following an exclusion decision. 
The same situation occurs within the EU. It was suggested that 
UNHCR considers persons excluded from the 1951 Refugee 
Convention under 1F to fall outside the mandate of the 
institution and therefore it would be hard to gain its support 
for drafting guidelines on UBUs. However, recently published 
documents by UNHCR, which refer to excluded persons, might 
suggest a willingness to at least engage with the issue. 
Turning specifically to the EU, first the EU-Turkey joint action 
plan (readmission agreement for third country nationals) was 
discussed, which was seen by some as a form of cooperation to 
control migration flows. It was noted that refugees and asylum 
seekers cannot be returned unless there is a negative RSD 
decision. Re-admission agreements also exist outside Europe 
as can be seen from the relationship between Pakistan and Sri 
Lanka. 
In EU member states there is an 18-month maximum detention 
period, although non-cooperation can be a reason to detain 
UBUs. While long-term detention appears to benefit no one, 
perhaps states see the value in detaining small numbers to act 
as a deterrent to others. 
The idea of a Guantanamo Bay detention centre like situation 
or removal of undesirables to a third country by the EU was 
effectively dismissed due to recognition that all states within 
the EU are bound by international human rights law, even in 
relation to treatment in third countries. However it could be 
possible to return a person to a third country if he or she agreed 
to the transfer. 
In the US, exclusion is considered before inclusion and there is 
no domestic movement trying to challenge this idea. Strategic 
ligation could though help politicise the debate. While there 
is healthy dialogue between the US and EU on a number of 
issues, it appears that on return and asylum they are currently 
in separate worlds.
Finally, it was suggested by some that law and justice are 
drifting away from one another, with a proliferation of 
restrictive domestic law and expulsions for minor crimes (i.e. 
minor criminals being treated the same as terrorists). 
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Session 9: Roundtable discussion: Towards harmonised solutions 
The roundtable started with a recap by the organisers of the starting position at the beginning of the conference and some key 
points taken from the two days. 
1. Scope: The conference focused on a broad range of immigrants, asylum seekers as well as other types of immigrants. Undesirability, 
as defined in this conference, can be caused by three types of measures which relate to serious criminality:
i) Article 1F exclusion of persons believed to have committed crimes before arriving in the host state. While it is difficult 
to determine the size of this group, it appears small within the European and US setting. However it is likely to grow 
in the near future;
ii) Revoking the status of persons who commit crimes after arriving in the host state. From the available data this group 
appears large; 
iii) Not granting status or revoking a status because of adverse security assessments. This issue appears small in scale, 
with people who fit this category seemingly in the hundreds rather than the thousands.
The problem of unreturnability exists due to both legal and practical reasons.
There is incredible diversity between the people contained within these groups, from petty criminals to alleged war criminals and 
suspected terrorists. In addition, public perceptions of the issue are mixed. Some communities accept the inclusion of UBUs in the 
host state while the climate in other countries is extremely hostile. 
2. Policy responses on how to deal with UBUs: Looking at solutions, prosecution and extradition are possible but there are 
considerable obstacles to both options. The use of bilateral MoUs has also had limited success. The granting of temporary status 
appears to differ greatly among states (for example Norway, the UK and France all appear to grant temporary status on different 
grounds with different conditions attached, whereas e.g. the Netherlands does not grant any status at all); All modalities cause 
economic and social harm to the individuals involved and appear to be a result of political contestation on the parts of states who 
are at a loss as how to respond to the issue. 
3. Alternative approaches: There are many ways to tackle the issue of unreturnability, such as changing the system to bring down 
numbers, which could involve i) limiting instances of revocation of refugee status and citizenship; ii) limiting 1F exclusions only to 
cases where prosecution is possible. Alternatively, other approaches could involve offering incentives to return or third country 
resettlements negotiated through diplomacy and assurances. Regardless of what approach is used, there will always be people left 
in the host state. Responses to these unreturnables could include:
i) Detaining or housing UBUs in prison or a designated reception facility (as happens in the US, Australia and Denmark);
ii) Using a model whereby there is the possibility of granting some form of permanent status after unremovabiility has 
persisted for a number of years, as is the case in Sweden;
iii) Mechanistic approach – issuing a residence permit after a certain period of time has passed in which the individual 
has demonstrated that they cannot be returned and any security issues have been resolved;
iv) A Coherent Balancing Test – balancing a number of factors before granting a form of permanent status, such as 
security tests, assessing the crime that was committed/alleged to have been committed and level of involvement of 
the individual in the crime, the time passed since the crime occurred and any humanitarian considerations on part of 
the individual, such as serious medical issues.
The floor was then opened for a discussion. 
The roundtable discussion focused on the two main themes of scope and policy response. In addition, throughout the conference 
and the roundtable concerns were raised regarding the lack of publically available data on UBUs by states and international 
organisations. 
Scope
It was suggested that the goal should be to reduce the number of UBUs as much as possible. One way to go about is to use 
more strict criteria in excluding individuals. Another option discussed was to use a proportionality test after someone is excluded 
and when return is being contemplated. Factors which could then be taken into account are e.g. when the alleged crime was 
committed and the level of complicity. 
While this approach may be possible when simply focusing on 1F-excluded persons, alternative approaches may be needed if 
UBUs are defined more broadly. If the focus is narrowed to 1F-excluded persons, however, then these solutions may have qualities 
transferrable to other groups of UBUs. 
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One reason put forward as to why we do not have a robust definition of undesirability is that each state sees the issue slightly 
differently. While the UK’s definition is widening, others are narrowing. Another option would be to treat all UBUs as if they were 
nationals.
The scope of the issue is an interesting debate, with each group of UBUs giving rise to different issues. Keeping the typology wide 
at this stage allows for comparative analysis (i.e. how group one compares to group two). Lateral discussions of this nature are 
very helpful. 
Policy response
States are currently only responding with short-term responses to UBUs when in fact this is a long-term issue. It is clear however 
that states are aware that many people are left in legal limbo and current approaches are unsustainable in the long-term.
It was noted that there has been a lack of leadership on this issue internationally. This might be explained by the sensitive legal 
and political issues involved, capacity to deal with the UBU issue (e.g. costs of prosecution, extradition, rehabilitation) or the 
prioritisation of other concerns. 
In relation to returns and removals, it was suggested that if states in the EU were serious about these options, then member 
states should negotiate together. For example, States could together negotiate assurances with a particular or number of third 
States as part of a removal or extradition process. Such an agreement might have more persuasive when assessed by a national or 
supranational court. 
Rehabilitation was seen as a purposive approach to this issue. If you focus on rehabilitation for the majority, (i.e. those who have a 
low level of complicity in 1F crimes or are prosecuted in the host state for relatively minor crimes) you are then left with a smaller 
group of more serious (suspected) criminals who should be prosecuted. However, in the UK criminal system rehabilitation is not 
available to foreign nationals and this approach is unlikely to receive much support from the government. 
Even within the category of 1F-excluded persons, there is the possibility of a wide range of responses ranging from punishment 
to rehabilitation. For example it was suggested that for child soldiers there should be hope and a push for rehabilitation, while 
perhaps punishment is the most suitable response for a person who committed war crimes decades earlier. Individual circumstances 
therefore need to be taken into account when responses to UBUs are determined. 
Local integration is also a complex issue, which has become a hot topic again due to the Syrian crisis. Integrating 1F-excluded 
persons is particularly difficult where proximity to the home state is an issue, although it was suggested that perhaps third country 
integrations might be a more successful. In the UK, INGOs such as Detention Action have adopted successful grass root programmes 
to aid integration of young FNOs, for example the ‘Community Support Groups’ initiative. 
It was also noted that proximity plays a role when discussing responses. The response of India and Turkey (in a context where two 
million refugees have fled across its borders in recent years) to UBUs will be very different to countries like Canada, whose refugee 
population is based on tightly controlled resettlement programmes. 
Turning to responses in the context of Europe, it was suggested that responses by EU states show the conflict that still exists 
between human rights law and domestic policies based on security and sovereignty. While states are required to follow the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR, in reality they wish to avoid a rights-based approach to UBUs and be left alone to make their own 
decisions on an individualised case-by-case basis. 
Obviously this raises grave concerns, as an individualised case-by-case approach runs the risk of granting wide discretion to states. 
Where two states will deal with the same issue in completely different ways, this could run counter to the demands of fairness 
and justice. Potentially there is a role for the European Commission to create an overarching rights-based framework, which would 
allow for some individual state discretion. 
Finally, the approach taken by Sweden was discussed. In relation to 1F-excluded persons, Sweden has a three-pillar system. Under 
Pillar three, even though undeserving of protection a person may be granted residence (although where possible any crimes 
should be prosecuted). Similar to Norway, UBUs are given temporary status first, for a maximum of 1 year at a time. Eventually 
though the person can gain permanent residence, and rehabilitation is always an option. This very narrow approach taken by 
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